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
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# The Philosophy of Natural Science and Comparative Law\*

F. S. C. NORTHROP

I find it impossible to acknowledge the honor and face the duty which is mine upon this occasion without recalling those events which make the past year unique for philosophers everywhere and especially so for us here in the United States. I refer to the deaths of those noted in our business meeting of yesterday. The variety and quality of their work and the range of their influences upon school and church and state and upon the natural and social sciences, the arts and letters give one pride in one's profession. They also bring me to the topic of this paper with a deep sense of indebtedness and an even stronger feeling of inadequacy.

They remind us also of the diverse conclusions to which philosophical study leads inquiring minds. But even the differences perhaps express a truth. This observation takes on more concrete significance when one notes that the diverse cultures of the world embody many of our different philosophical conclusions. Thus the plurality of philosophical theories is in part at least paralleled by an empirical diversity of cultures which exemplify them. This suggests that even the disagreements of philosophers are less speculative and merely subjective in origin than might at first be supposed, and represent instead something in the experience of mankind which, in part at least, is empirical and objective in character.

It will help us in pursuing this suggestion further if we restrict our examination of both philosophy and culture to a single element in each. In considering different cultures, we shall, therefore, converge upon their law. In examining their respective philosophies, we shall attend to their theories of knowledge.

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\*Presidential address delivered before the forty-ninth annual meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association at the City College of New York, December 29, 30, 31, 1952.

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The restriction of culture to its legal factor has several advantages. Law is concerned with communal norms. Hence, it draws attention immediately to the social ethos of a culture. Thereby ethics is brought into the heart of our inquiry. Also, law provides ethics with explicitly expressed content as formulated by the people themselves of a given culture. The anthropologist Kluckhohn in his study of the Navaho Indians has shown this to be very important.<sup>1</sup> Many previous anthropologists went astray because, overlooking the importance of concepts as well as of facts in scientific description, they described what they saw in the concepts of the culture, or of the school of social science from which they came, rather than in the concepts used by the people of the culture being described. The ethics of a culture becomes distorted when this occurs since, as the sequel will show, ethics is essentially connected with the elementary concepts or philosophy used by a people to describe and integrate the raw data of their experience.

Restriction to the law of a culture has a third advantage. Legal procedures and codes contain explicitly expressed content. Hence comparative law permits the problems of ethics to be examined in terms of the content of different types of specific ethical norms, after the manner in which the verified theories of natural science allow the nature of knowing to be determined by an analysis of different specific successful instances of knowing.

Finally law provides ethics with operational definitions. Thereby the pragmatic differences of various ethical theories with respect to specific instances of ethical disagreement are exhibited. In law an ethical theory cannot protect itself from its weaknesses, as occurs in the ethical discussion of much contemporary philosophy, by remaining in an ivory tower restricting its attention to abstract nouns like "goodness," "duty," "emotive meaning" or "instrumental values which are at once means and ends." Of any ethical theory as proposed for law, the judge cannot avoid asking: What difference does it make with respect to my decision in this particular case?

The full role of law as the operational application of ethical theory does not become evident, however, until one examines the operational applications to similar disputes of different ethical theories in different cultures. The law of a single culture merely takes its particular ethical theory for granted and applies it to the settling of disputes in that

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<sup>1</sup>Kluckhohn, Clyde, "The Philosophy of the Navaho Indians," *Ideological Differences and World Order*, F. S. C. Northrop, editor, Yale University Press, 1949, pp. 356-384.

culture. The full significance of comparative law appears, therefore, only when we find two or more cultures embodying different ethical theories and then examine the different legal operational consequences with respect to similar disputes in the two cultures.

Most if not all cultures have legal codes. There are, however, very important differences with respect to both the nature and the use of legal codes in different cultures. As a first approximation, the world's legal procedures and codes fall into three major groups. We shall call them: (1) The intuitive mediational type, (2) The natural history type and (3) The abstract contractual type.

### *The Intuitive Mediational Type*

This type of law predominates in any culture which is Confucian, Buddhist, Taoist, or non-Aryan Hindu. By non-Aryan Hindu is meant that portion of any Hindu culture which is not the contribution of the ancient Aryan conquerors of India. Gandhi's Hinduism is an example.

The procedure of this type of law is to push legal codes into the background, preferably dispensing with them altogether, and to bring the disputants into a warm give-and-take relationship, usually by way of a mediator, so that previously made demands can be modified gracefully, and a unique solution taking all the exceptional circumstances of the case into account is spontaneously accepted by both disputants. Codes there may be, but they are to be used only as a last resort, and even then recourse to them brings shame upon the disputants. The moral man, Confucius teaches, does not indulge in litigation. Gandhi's revulsion, during and after his South African period, to Western law and his use instead of the warm-hearted intuitive way of his beloved Bhagavadgita is an instance of the same ethical attitude. In Buddhist Bangkok in 1950 I found the Chief Justice of its Supreme Court and a former Chief Justice of its next highest court, the Court of Appeals, who ostensibly were applying that most abstract of Western law, the French Continental Code, assuring me that they often refused to hear the case and urged the disputants, if Thais, to settle their differences by themselves in the approved Buddhist manner. In one instance after two such refusals and two failures of the disputants to reach agreement by themselves, the judges declined a third time to proceed in the Western manner, with the result that the intuitive mediational way succeeded.

Note its distinguishing characteristic: Not only is there no resort

to a legal rule; there is also no judge. Even the mediator refuses to give a decision. Instead, the dispute is properly settled when the disputants, using the mediator merely as an emissary, come to mutual agreement in the light of all the existential circumstances, past, present and future.

The word "future" is used advisedly. In this type of ethics and law there is no irrelevant evidence, not even future possible evidence is neglected. For always the mediator or the adversaries themselves will remind any disputant that it is better to settle for a little less today and preserve tomorrow's goodwill than to obtain more today and lose tomorrow's goodwill.

Not the abstract universals of a legal code, but the existential particularity of the concrete problematic situation, in all its ramifications—familial, village, present, past and future—is the criterion of the just and the good in any culture in which this intuitive mediational type of law predominates. Evidently the first instrumental pragmatist, sensitive to the particular problematic situation in all its dimensions of experience, was not born in Vermont; nor did the first existentialist come to birth in Paris or even in Copenhagen.

Lest you suppose that this reference to Dewey, Kierkegaard and Sartre is strained, let it be noted now, as the sequel will show, that behind this intuitive, mediational type of law in Asia, there is a Confucian, Buddhist and pre-Aryan Hindu epistemology which affirms that full, direct and exact empirical knowledge of any individual, relation or event in nature reveals it to be unique, and from this observation infers that to treat any individual, such as a person, or any event, such as a dispute between persons, as an instance of a non-nominalistic class concept or a universal legal rule is to act contrary to fact and hence to falsify human nature.

Dewey's emphasis upon the unique character of each problematic situation and his identification of the good with that particular solution which results from a sensitivity to all its experienceable dimensions, expresses the same theory of ethics. Note also that it entails that the good for ethics reduces to the true for empirically complete, direct and exact knowledge. Sartre expresses the same ethics and epistemology when he insists that one falsifies human nature and ethical decision when one exhausts the individual in the abstract universal, or in any number of such universals.

In Asia, as for Dewey here, this intuitive mediational type of ethics and law has been combined with another point of view. This brings

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us to the ethics of codified law. There are two kinds: The natural history type and the abstract contractual type.

### *The Natural History Type of Law*

Its codes differ from those of our third type of law in two respects. First, they are expressed in the syntactical grammar of the language of common sense objects and relations. Second, the codes describe the social norms of the inductively given status quo.

Those philosophers and lawyers known as the Legalists illustrate this natural history type of law for classical China. The Laws of Manu, which together with the syntactical Sanskrit language are the contribution to Hindu India of its ancient Aryan conquerers, exemplify it for classical India. Muhammadan legal codes, from the standpoint of which Allah, or his representative on earth, passes judgment, provide the Islamic example. In fact, as Sir Henry S. Maine has shown in his classic study of ancient law, all codified ancient law—Eastern, Middle Eastern or Western—before the time of the Stoic Romans was of this second type.<sup>2</sup> Not only were its codes expressed in common sense terms but they also merely described and thereby tended to freeze the norms of the traditional status quo. It was in short, as he so aptly said, a law of status.<sup>3</sup>

It still lives in the contemporary world. Two years ago I was in Cairo where Egyptians, who had received their legal education in Paris, apply the Stoic Roman and modern Western type of abstract contractual law modeled on the French Continental Code. After driving fifty miles west I entered a village where, through an interpreter, I questioned the village leader about the settling of local disputes. By a lucky circumstance our conversation was interrupted by a local villager. It seems that a neighbor's dog had killed some of his chickens. He had spoken to the neighbor about the matter but nothing had been done. Instantly the elder replied and, evidently satisfied, the villager withdrew. Meanwhile the interpreter translated the elder's reply. It was that he would speak to the neighbor, telling him to tie up the animal, and if he failed to do so he would have the dog shot.

Upon being asked how he could be sure that the one party to the dispute correctly portrayed the facts of the case, the reply was that he

<sup>2</sup>Maine, Sir Henry S., *Ancient Law, Its Connection With the Early History of Society and Its Relation to Modern Ideas*, John Murray, London, 1908.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 151.

knew both parties well and that since there had been no previous ill-will between them, there was no reason to think that the villager making the complaint had misrepresented the situation. This was as things would be in a Far Eastern village where the intuitive mediational type of law predominates.

There was, however, one important difference. The village elder had decided. He had sat in judgment and given a verdict. There was no mediation. This was the operational sign that in his Islamic village we were confronted with the second rather than the first type of law.

Furthermore, were the owner of the dog not to follow the common sense rule, as applied by the village elder, the apparatus of the local and even the provincial police would come down upon him. The sanction for the decision is not, as with the intuitive mediational type of law, the mutually achieved and accepted agreement of the disputants, but instead the common sense rule as applied by the duly constituted authority and backed with police power. The unique aspects of the dispute, the defendant, or the problematic situation have nothing to do with the matter. Conduct is good if it corresponds to the common sense code as applied by the appropriate authority; it is bad if it does not. Before this code all men are equal; they are instances of the same universals; their existential particularity is ethically irrelevant.

#### *The Abstract Contractual Type of Law*

This type of codified law differs from the natural history type in that it replaces common sense language with a technical terminology. This has the very important consequence of freeing ethical and legal norms from the mere natural history description of the social status quo, thereby permitting the construction of legal and social entities and relations different from any which are observed in any traditional society. This type of law came into being for the first time with the Roman Stoic philosophers who created the Western science of law. The manner in which it differs from all previous codified law has been described by Sir Henry Maine in his classic study, as "the shift from status to contract."<sup>4</sup>

We of the West are more cognizant of the differences between examples of this third type of law than of their identities. For the purposes of this paper, the identities constitute the really interesting and important factor.

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<sup>4</sup>*Op. cit.*, p. 151.

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The ethics to which this third type of law gives expression is radically different from that of either the mediational or the natural history type of law. It differs from the former in that it regards the initial recourse to codes as a good way to settle disputes. It differs from the latter in two very important ways. First its identification of the ethical and the socially legal with abstractly and imaginatively constructed, rather than with inductively described, human norms and relations makes possible ethical and legal reform. Both ethics and law are freed from the norms of the traditional status quo. Second its norms have much greater generality. Instead of identifying the ethically good with inductively observed tribal, caste, class or color concepts, the good can be identified with all individuals who freely accept the postulates of the contractually constructed system. Thereby moral man becomes identified more and more with universal man. Put more exactly what this means is that a contractually constructed norm cannot be regarded as ethical unless if it holds for any one individual it also holds for any other. The more concrete ethical implications of this type of law become evident when one notes that every culture in the world to which Western science and this type of law have penetrated is at the present moment undergoing a revolution in its ethical and legal norms.

Clearly, these three types of law express three different, and in part conflicting, conceptions of the ethically good. Is it possible to determine the factor upon which these ethical differences turn?

#### *The Criterion of Ethical and Legal Norms*

Consider first the difference with respect to the proper method to be used to settle disputes as conceived by the Confucianists and the Legalists in ancient China. The Confucian attitude has been described in detail by the former Chinese lawyer and judge, S. F. Liu, my colleague in the Yale Law School, and by the Confucian, Chiang Monlin, former Chancellor of Peking National University, former member of President Chiang Kai-shek's National Yuan at Chungking and former student of Professor Overstreet when he was at Berkeley and of Dewey here in New York.<sup>5</sup> Both Liu and Chiang agree that according to pre-Western Confucian Chinese theory and practice the resort to codes in the settling of disputes was regarded as morally evil, only to be in-

<sup>5</sup>Liu, Shih-Fang, "Westernized Administration of Justice and Chinese Racial Characteristics," as translated from the Chinese by Alfred Wang, Yale Law Library; Chiang Monlin, *Tides From the West*, Yale University Press, 1947.

dulged in as a last resort in the case of immoral and unwise men who do not accept the appropriate social norms and procedure. The appropriate way is that of warm fellow feeling, leisurely mediation through a third party and compromise reached by mutual agreement. The entire process proceeds informally, taking into account the whole lifetime and even ancestral family background of the disputants and all the unique circumstances of the case.

The Chinese Legalists on the other hand stood for the use of codes as the moral, legal and necessary way to order social relations and settle disputes. One of their arguments was that otherwise social organization over wider areas beyond the reach of warm person to person contact within the patriarchal joint family and between the joint families at the village level is not possible.

We begin to see the reason for the different ethical theories of the Confucian and Legalistic schools when we examine the epistemological theories which distinguish them. Epistemologically the issue between them turned around the question whether common sense class concepts are nominalistic or real universals, where by a real universal is meant one in which the universality refers to something in the objects symbolized, and by a nominalistic universal is meant one in which the universality has its basis solely in the symbol, the objective reference of the symbol being comprised of nothing but particular individuals, each one of which is unique. The Chinese expressed this technical philosophical question in a very concrete way: When one is confronted by four individuals, is one faced with four things or with five? The Confucianists affirm the former alternative; the Legalists the latter, insisting that the class of the four individuals is the fifth factor.

The ethics of "the middle path" of Buddhist culture with its preference for and present persisting practice of the mediational, rather than the codified litigational method of settling disputes, notwithstanding Western influences to the contrary, derives also from a nominalistic epistemology. An examination of the Buddha's teaching and the training of his earliest priests shows that the basis of both was a testing of the meaning of abstract nouns against the immediately apprehended data of direct experience to reveal only nominalistic particulars, *esse est percipi* relativity, and the transitoriness of any determinate thing including even the particular knowing ego. For the Buddha and his early priests, good conduct consisted in not being misled by words or, to put the matter positively, in being guided by the immediately given data from which all words in Buddhist knowledge derive their mean-

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ings.<sup>6</sup> Confucius expressed the same essential connection between ethics and epistemology when he said that ethics consists in "the rectification of names."<sup>7</sup> Apparently, the first semanticist was not born in the Twentieth Century.

During his South African period Gandhi developed a similar antipathy, from which he never recovered, to the Western legal methods of settling disputes by codes and litigation. He found the inspiration for the proper way, he tells us, in the Hindu Bhagavadgita and Upanishads.<sup>8</sup> Actually this Hindu tradition contains both the pacifistic mediational ethics common to Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism, which Gandhi singled out and espoused, and the codified litigational method with its use of law backed with force introduced into Hinduism by the ancient Aryan conquerors from the West. Gandhi conveniently overlooked this legalistic Aryan element in Hinduism when he read his Gita and other Hindu classics. The non-Aryan purely indigenously Asian component of Hinduism can be shown to rest also upon a nominalistic epistemology. Even the universal Brahman of non-dualistic Vedanta Hinduism is existential, and hence nominalistic, in character as the Hindu philosophers Professor Chatterjee and Datta have pointed out.<sup>9</sup>

It appears, therefore, that the difference in the ethical norms of the Confucianists and the Legalists in classical China has its roots in a difference in their epistemology of natural knowledge. The epistemology of the ethics of the intuitive, mediational type of law which the Confucian illustrates, is radical empiricism with its nominalistic theory of the class concept. The epistemology of the ethics of the natural history type of law which the Legalists affirmed in naive realism with its theory of real as opposed to nominalistic universals.

Several facts support the latter thesis that there is an essential connection between the ethics of the natural history type of codified law and the epistemology of naive realism. First there is the aforementioned fact that the Chinese Legalists found the basis for their ethics —

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<sup>6</sup>Dutt, Nalinakasha, *Early Monastic Buddhism*, Calcutta Oriental Series No. 30, Calcutta Oriental Press, Ltd., Calcutta, Vol. I, 1941, Vol. II, 1945.

<sup>7</sup>Creel, H. G., *Confucius, the Man and the Myth*, John Day Co., New York, 1949, p. 221.

<sup>8</sup>Gandhi, M. K., *Gandhi's Autobiography, The Story of My Experiments With Truth*, Public Affairs Press, Washington, 1948, pp. 323-324.

<sup>9</sup>Chatterjee, Satishchandra and D. Datta, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, University of Calcutta, 1948, p. 431.

of dispute settling by recourse to codes of the natural history type in the epistemological theory of real universals and fought the ethical issue with the Confusianists over this point. Second, an examination of the natural history type of code in any culture shows that such codes are clearly the product of a people who have conceptualized their empirical experience in terms of the objects, relations and observable tribal, caste, family and color groupings of naive common sense and who believe that this way of thinking about things is basic to all ethical and legal relations and distinctions. Such a way of thinking is characteristic of anyone whose epistemological theory is that of naive realism.

But what, it may be asked, does the epistemological issue of nominalistic versus real universals in the empirical knowledge of natural objects have to do with the ethical issue concerning whether legal codes are or are not good as the initial means for ordering social relations and settling disputes between men?

The answer seems to be as follows: If true knowledge of any individual entity or event in nature as determined by analyzing the empirically verified propositions of natural knowledge to bring out the character and sources of their meaning indicates that only existential, inductive particularity exists, then each person and dispute is unique and to treat either as an instance of a universal class concept is, as the Sartrean existentialists in our time affirm, to treat it falsely and hence to act immorally. If, on the other hand, as the epistemology of the Chinese Legalists affirms, true knowledge of individuals indicates that they instance a universal, common factor the same for all, then to treat them as measurable by the abstract nouns of universal propositions or codes which designate this common factor, is the only way to treat them truly in terms of what they are, and therefore morally.

Note what the aforementioned connection between epistemology and ethics in Chinese, Buddhist and Hindu cultures signifies. It means that the word "good" is not, as the empiricist G. E. Moore or the idealist Urban affirmed, a primitive concept but is instead a defined concept—a concept defined in part at least in terms of the true with respect to the epistemology of empirical knowledge. It follows that ethical sentences are not merely emotive or hortatory; they are also cognitive. Or to put the matter in another way, if epistemological propositions are cognitive rather than emotive, then ethical propositions are also.

This definition of the ethically good for dispute settling in terms of the empirically true for epistemology is not circular. Certainly no

epistemologist would maintain that the empirical question of whether class concepts are nominalistic or real universals involves an ethical judgment.

It is to be noted also that the question of what we are knowing when we know an individual so far as his unique particularity or universality is concerned is quite independent of whether the individual be a human being or natural object or event. This means that the ethics of a culture is essentially connected not merely with epistemology but with the epistemology of the knowledge of natural objects and events, or in other words with its empirically verified philosophy of natural science. Certainly the empirical correctness of one epistemology rather than another can be determined by appeal to instances of individuals or events in nature the same for any culture. This has the important consequence of freeing ethics and law from cultural relativism.

But, it may be asked, if empirical evidence in nature, common to all cultures decides the epistemology of any culture, which in turn determines its ethics, why then do different philosophers and different cultures facing approximately the same natural phenomena arrive at different epistemological and legal theories? Part of the answer to this question will become clear if we press one step further the analysis of the difference between the Confucian and Chinese Legalists' ethics for ordering social relations and settling disputes. What was there in the Chinese knowledge of nature which convinced the Chinese philosophers generally, and the people following them, of the correctness of the Confucian epistemology and ethics?

Chiang Monlin throws important light on this question when he tells us that the only method of knowing nature discovered by the Chinese was what he terms "naive observation."<sup>10</sup> Such a method of knowing restricts the meaning of concepts to what is given purely empirically and directly with immediacy. To the philosophically uncritical such naive direct observation seems to warrant the epistemology of naive realism with its belief in gross public objects independent of perceivers, possessing the qualities and shapes which one actually senses. With time, however, in any culture a more exact examination of what radically empirical observation gives reveals this theory to be both false and self-contradictory. As Berkeley and Hume showed the modern West and as Confucian, Buddhist and Vedanta Hindu philosophers showed the classical Orient, every factor which naive realism

<sup>10</sup>Chiang, Monlin, *Tides From the West*, Yale University Press, 1947, p. 251.

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assumes to be the same for everybody and independent of the perceiver turns out to vary from perceiver to perceiver and hence to be relative to the perceiver. The assumption, therefore, that radically empirical or naive observation gives objects independent of the perceiver with qualities the same for everyone breaks down. In fact the common sense theory of naive realism is self-contradictory since its realism asserts the belief in public objects with qualities the same for everybody independent of the perceiver and its naive way of knowing gives only qualities and relations which vary from perceiver to perceiver and whose *esse est percipi*. Clearly a theory which defines objects purporting to be independent of perceivers in terms of objects which vary from perceiver to perceiver is self-contradictory. The Confucianists had no difficulty, therefore, in showing that the very method of knowing nature used by Confucianists and Legalists alike, namely, that of naive observation, did not justify the Legalists' epistemology with its assumption of objective meanings the same for all individuals in a class and hence did not justify the Legalists' ethics for dispute settling.

The fact, therefore, that the scientists or sages of different cultures arrive at different epistemological theories of the meanings of the concepts they use to describe and coordinate the raw data of their experience which in turn entail correspondingly different ethical and legal norms does not mean that their conclusions are not objective in a sense which makes them valid for anybody in any culture. It may mean, as is the case with the Chinese Confucianists and Legalists, that one of the epistemological and ethical theories is erroneous in a sense which can be shown to be true for anybody in any culture. It may mean also, as Chiang Monlin has shown to be the case for classical Chinese culture and for the West, that one culture has found one empirically verified way of knowing nature with its particular epistemology and ethics and that the other culture has found a different empirically verified way and that both can be shown to be valid in a sense which can be confirmed by anyone anywhere.

The latter possibility brings us to our third type of law. Does it also derive from a particular scientific method and epistemology?

It was mentioned earlier that the intuitive, existential theory of ethics with its thesis that each ethical problem is unique, and hence not amenable to treatment by codes the same for all occasions, is supplemented with the belief in the resort to codes, not merely in the case of Asia, but also in the case of Dewey. Why in Dewey's case also?

The answer is that Dewey's procedure for resolving any prob-

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lematic situation includes the methods of Western science, and, according to Western science, no individual or event is fully known when it is merely denotatively sensed as an existentially unique particular or even when it is described in terms of the common sense objects and relations of natural history science; in addition the hypothetically proposed and axiomatically formulated universal laws which it illustrates must be found and indirectly and operationally verified empirically.

Our former President, Morris R. Cohen, and his colleague, Professor Drabkin tell us in their *Source Book in Greek Science* that this way of knowing individual entities, events and relations in nature was developed for the first time by the mathematical physicists of ancient Greece. They write that:

... all the evidence indicates that the ideal of rigorously deductive proof, the method of developing a subject by a chain of theorems based on definitions, axioms, and postulates, and the constant striving for complete generality and abstraction are the specific contributions of the Greeks to mathematics.<sup>11</sup>

Chiang Monlin tells us also in his *Tides From the West* that this way of knowing any individual or event in nature is foreign to traditional Chinese mentality and that he became acquainted with it for the first time when he came to the United States in the 1920's and was introduced to the natural philosophy of ancient Greece at the University of California at Berkeley by our own Professor Overstreet, then beginning his teaching career there. Chiang Monlin notes also that this novel way of thinking arose in the abstract, deductively formulated mathematical physics of ancient Greece and entails a novel epistemology. Albert Einstein expresses the same fact when he tells us that the person who has not been thrilled by Euclid does not understand modern mathematical physics.<sup>12</sup>

Nor do the ethical implications of this novel epistemology of natural knowledge escape Chiang Monlin. For he concludes that there will be no effective introduction of modern Western technological, ethical and legal forms into China until his fellow countrymen are taught the epistemology of Western deductively formulated natural science. Otherwise the way of thinking about individual persons and the

<sup>11</sup>Cohen, Morris R. and I. E. Drabkin, *A Source Book in Greek Science*, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New York, 1948, p. 1.

<sup>12</sup>Einstein, Albert, *The World As I See It*, Covici Friede, New York, 1934, pp. 31-32.

events that are their disputes, which is required to make modern Western ethical and legal values and forms meaningful and effective, will not be present.

This awareness on Chiang Monlin's part of an essential connection between the ethics of our third type of law and the epistemology of Western mathematical physics is not born of merely theoretical considerations. It has its basis also in his increasing awareness over many years, during his Chancellorship of Peking National University, of the failure of modern Western ethical and political forms to take deep root in his country, and in his penetrating analysis of its cause.

Events in the West, following the mathematical physics of ancient Greece, support his conclusions. It is a significant historical fact that the abstract, contractual type of law appeared for the first time in history when this new scientific way of knowing individuals and events in nature passed over from the ancient Greek mathematical physicists through every school of Greek philosophy—Stoic, Platonic and Aristotelian—to Rome where it modeled the action of the Scaevolas and other Roman Stoic philosophers who created the Western science of law. The idea of a truly known individual or event as a contractually constructed individual instancing deductively formulated universal laws had taken hold of their minds.

The novelty of this new way of knowing individuals and events has not received the attention which it deserves. It is as important for epistemology as it is for ethics.

For the first time in history it put a realistic epistemology upon a meaningfully consistent and empirically verifiable basis. This becomes clear if we compare the concepts of an atom in the deductively formulated mathematical physics of Democritus and in the theory of the Asian Charvakian materialists. An examination of the latter, or of any other Asian, realistic epistemology will show that in every instance its purportedly realistic common sense or scientific objects were defined in terms of sensed objects, relations and qualities. For example, the atom of fire was defined as that which is sensed to be hot and dry. Clearly this is self-contradictory, as careful Asian epistemologists were soon to show and as we have previously indicated: Objects which are independent of perceivers clearly cannot be defined in terms of objects, relations or qualities which have no existence apart from particular perceivers and perceptions.

Democritus and the other Greek mathematical physicists were aware of this and saw consequently that if scientific objects independent of perceivers are to be logically consistent and meaningful

objects of scientific knowledge they cannot be defined in terms of objects and relations given through the senses. This is undoubtedly why he, and Plato following him, and Galilei and Newton following them, declared that sensed objects and relations are mere appearances and designate nothing objective in nature independent of perceivers, but are instead, as Galilei put the matter, "mere name[s]".<sup>13</sup> Put more precisely what this means is that concepts referring for their entire meaning to such individuals given through the senses are nominalistic rather than real universals. Their universality has its basis solely in the name or symbol, not in what is symbolized.

But how then are scientific individuals and events independent of perceivers to be defined if they cannot be defined in terms of factors given through the senses with radically empirical immediacy? The answer of Democritus appears in Book VII of Euclid's *Elements*. This is the portion of Greek mathematical physics that was the creation of the Democriteans. The answer is that a truly known scientific object is an individual entity that satisfies or instances a formally and postulationally constructed system of universal rules or laws which have been experimentally verified. Or to put the matter more concretely, the scientific object which is a Democritean atom is, so far as the realistic, *non-esse est percipi* component of its meaning is concerned, any entity which satisfies the theorems and postulates of Book VII of Euclid. Similarly the scientific object which is the electron of contemporary physics is any entity which satisfies certain entity variables in the deductively formulated universal laws of either the electromagnetic theory of Lorentz or the theory of quantum mechanics. What one means by an electron is quite different in these two theories, since the postulates of the two theories are different. Only the latter of the two theories, however, is confirmed in its deductive consequences. Thus the Lorentzian concept of the electron is meaningful but not confirmed in all of its deductive consequences, and the concept of the electron in quantum mechanics is both meaningful and verified.

The concepts of such scientific objects are real rather than merely nominalistic universals. This follows because, by the very nature of their scientific construction and designation, they are instances of universal laws. This, rather than sensed similarity, is the criterion of a real, as opposed to, a nominalistic universal.

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<sup>13</sup>Burr, Edwin A., *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science, A Historical and Critical Essay*, Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc., New York, 1925, p. 75.

Sensed similarity fails as a criterion of real universals because sensed similarity is as relative to perceivers as is any other item of knowledge given through the senses. For example, I happen to be color blind with respect to green. Thus the colors which I sense as similar are not those which other people sense as similar. Meanings the same for all minds, and in this sense universal, are not therefore given through the senses. Such universality is verbal rather than real as Berkeley, and Galilei and Newton before him, emphasized, having its locus solely in the symbol and not in what is symbolized.

True universals are given only by formally, or axiomatically, designated individuals, since only such classes of individuals have, by virtue of the very nature of their scientific construction, the property of being instances of the same universal laws. Hence, only with classes of such individuals does the universality refer to something common to all the objects symbolized as well as to the character of the symbol. This, let it be remembered, is the difference between a real and a nominalistic universal.

Such individuals are universal also in a second sense. Being known as to their scientific properties only by the abstract formal method of axiomatic construction, no recourse to images is necessary for the knowledge of their theoretical scientific nature. This makes possible, to use the language of Socrates in Plato's Republic, "the dropping of all images," which in turn makes possible scientific objects whose meaning and existence is independent of their relation to perceivers.

Images have to be dropped if scientific objects of such a realistic epistemology are to be a logically self-consistent possibility, since all images, whether of the senses or of the imagination, are existential, denotative particulars, and all such items of knowledge, whether images of entities or relations, are relative to perceivers and not the same for all perceivers, and hence not such as to give, or to define, objects independent of, and the same for, all perceivers.

Axiomatically, designated individuals may, and usually do, escape this relativity. This is the case because every elementary meaning going into their total theoretical meaning is a primitive in the logic of relations or of propositional functions or in some other branch of mathematical logic and all such meanings, when determined by the methods appropriate for knowing them, are the same for all men, having no relativity to any perceiver or to any act of perception.

It is necessary to say that such scientific objects and relations *may* and *usually do* escape such relativity, because it is possible by this axiomatic method of determining the nature of entities and events

in nature to have a meaningful conception of nature in which certain entities and relations are the same for all perceivers, occasions and frames of reference and others exist only in such relativistic contexts. In fact, Einstein's special and general theories of relativity do exactly this.

Furthermore, it is doubtful if the distinction between the absolute and the relative in natural knowledge can be specified in any other way. Certainly it cannot be done by the epistemological method of radically empirical positivism since, as Asian epistemologists made evident long ago and as Berkeley and Hume have shown in modern times, all entities and relations known with empirical immediacy are relative to perceivers, as empirically known perceivers are relative to them; for all of them *esse est percipi*. This is another reason why classes made up of individuals that are sensed as similar do not give real universals.

Precisely because the entities and relations of deductively formulated natural science, whose meaning and existence are not such that *esse est percipi*, are not, and cannot be, identified with, or defined in terms of, sensed entities and relations, the verification of such individuals and relations has to be indirect by way of epistemic correlations joining them at some point with the relativistic, purely nominalistic classes of individuals and relations given through the senses, for which *esse est percipi*. For were axiomatically constructed natural objects and relations devoid of any specified relation to radically empirical immediacy, they would be theoretically meaningful but their existence as a highly probable actuality would not be verifiable. In other words, the epistemology of Western science is a correlation of two epistemologies: (1) Critical realism with its indirect mode of verification, its scientific objects and relations for which *esse* is not *percipi* and its real universals; and (2) existentialism or radically empirical positivism with its direct mode of verification, its unique particular entities and relations for all of which *esse est percipi*, and its nominalistic universals.

It is the former of these two epistemologies, first placed upon a consistent and empirically verifiable basis by the mathematical physicists of ancient Greece, that made possible and justified, in the minds and deeds of the Roman Stoic legal philosophers, the creation of the Western science of law with its technical terminology and its abstract contractual type of codes.

The Scaevolus and other Roman Stoic philosophers who created the novel Western abstract contractual science of law are explicit in saying that their ethics which this law embodies is the logic (i.e., the

scientific method and epistemology) of Greek physics applied to human institutions and conduct. In calling them Roman Stoics one must not commit the frequent error of supposing that they represented the view of only the followers of the Zenonian Greek Stoics. The fact that ethics was essentially connected to the epistemology of physics was held in common in Stoic Rome by Zenonian Stoics, Platonists and Aristotelians alike, as E. Vernon Arnold makes clear in his classic study of Roman Stoicism and as H. Rackham notes on the first page of his Preface to his English translation of Cicero's *De Natura Deorum*.<sup>14</sup> In fact Cicero, who held this theory of ethics, tells us that he was a Platonist.

In cultures whose sages or scientists have not discovered the deductively formulated, indirectly verified method of knowing individual entities, relations or events in nature, the ethics of our third type of law and the law itself does not exist, except as foreign influences have brought it in. In fact, the ethics of the law of contract in society is but the empirically verified epistemology of the law of constructs in natural science applied to the resolution of human disputes and the ordering of human relations.

We noted earlier that the three major types of law are operational applications of three different and in part at least conflicting conceptions of the ethically good. This caused us to ask whether it is possible to determine the issue upon which these differing conceptions of the ethically good turn. To this end we examined two things: First, the issue dividing the Chinese Confucianists, who affirm the ethics of the first type of law and condemn that of the second type, from the Legalists, who reverse the Confucian thesis. Second, we examined the factors which gave rise historically to the ethics of the third type of law. The result is as follows: The issue upon which the theories of the ethically good turn is epistemological rather than merely ethical in character. Moreover, the epistemological issue is resolved not by referring to ethical considerations or to cultural facts but by examining the epistemology of natural knowledge. In other words the ethics regarded as good for resolving the disputes of men and ordering their social relations in any culture derives from its antecedent epistemology which

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<sup>14</sup>Arnold, E. Vernon, *Roman Stoicism*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1911; *Cicero's De Natura Deorum Academica*, H. Rackham, translator, The Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, Ltd., London, 1933. See also Northrop's chapter in Ruth Nanda Anshen, *Moral Principles of Action, Man's Ethical Imperative*, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1952, pp. 128-139.

is exemplified in, and hence found by analyzing, its empirically verified way of knowing individual entities, relations or events in nature.

If the analysis of empirically verified knowledge reveals only individuals and events and relations which are private to particular percipients and perceptions, then there are no meanings, the same for all men and all the differing occasions which are their disputes, in terms of which codes applicable to all people and all disputes can be formulated. There only seem to be such meanings and rules due to a faulty semantics, or to use Confucius' language, due to a failure to rectify names. Or, to say the same thing in still another way, if empirically verified knowledge of nature reveals any individual or event to be a unique particular, then it is simply false to people and the events which are their disputes, to treat them, as the resort to codes the same for all men does, as if one individual or dispute is like others, and hence not unique.

If, on the other hand, empirically verified knowledge of any event or individual in nature exhibits the scientifically essential thing about anyone to be that it illustrates something in common with other individuals of a specifiable class, then there are meanings the same for all those individuals of that class in terms of which ethical codes for resolving their disputes can be formulated. Furthermore, if such is the nature of any empirically known event or individual in nature, then one does not treat individuals truly in terms of what they are unless one uses an ethics of codes for judging their moral behavior or resolving the dispute to which it gives rise.

The Confucianists seem to have won out over the Legalists in China on this issue because the Legalists' epistemological theory of natural knowledge was naive realism and the Confucianists had no difficulty in showing that the radical empiricism of its naive method of knowing gives only unique, denotative existential particulars each one of which is relative to perceivers and to perceptions. In other words, the only source of the meaning of words that the Legalists, like the Confucianists, had to point to was empirical immediacy as given in naive observation, and this gives only nominalistic, not real, universals.

This is also probably the reason why in the dialectical and historical development of Buddhism the realistic Hinayana system gives way to the radical existentialism and empiricism of nihilistic Mahayana and that in the history of the philosophy of India the realistic Hindu philosophies gave way, under analysis, to the similar radical empiricism and existentialism of non-dualist Vedanta.

Furthermore, because cultures in the world that have not derived

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from the science and natural philosophy of the ancient Greeks seem never to have discovered the axiomatic constructional method of knowing individuals as instances of universal laws, which alone justifies a theory of real universals and a belief in objects and events with empirically verified essential scientific properties the same for all instances of the variables for which they are the material constants, and the same for all perceivers and perceptions, they do not have the ethics of the abstract contractual type of law. Instead, their codes are always of the natural history type and tend, because of their epistemology of naive realism to be regarded as the ethically inferior way to settle disputes due to the tendency of a naive realistic epistemology to reveal its self-contradictory character and to go over under careful analysis into radical empiricism with its nominalistic theory of individuals that warrants only the intuitive mediational type of ethics of the Confucianists, the pacific Buddhists and Gandhi.

The conclusion seems to be that if we mean by ethics what we find it to mean as operationally applied in the major types of law of the world, then the assumption held since the time of Kant by most Western philosophers—idealists, realists and positivists alike—that ethics is an independent or autonomous science is false. Instead, ethics is essentially and antecedently connected to the rest of philosophy and especially to the epistemology of empirically verified knowledge of individual entities, relations and events in nature. This means that the word "good" is not a primitive concept as G. E. Moore has suggested or a primitive *a priori* intellectual presupposition as Urban affirmed. Instead it is a defined concept, a concept defined in part at least in terms of the epistemologically true as determined by analyzing the verified theories of natural knowledge.

One implication with respect to the verification of ethical propositions remains to be noted. It becomes evident when we ask how they are verified.

#### *Ethical Norms and Their Verification*

It has been the custom until recently to answer this question by saying that the verification of a set of ethical norms is possible after the manner of the verification of an abstractly constructed set of natural laws in physical science—that is by testing empirically their logical consequences. The pragmatic legal realists, who started out with this theory, have, however, after careful analysis and experimentation, come to reject it. The reason is clear and decisive. Ethical norms

do not conform to empirically given cultural facts; they transform them. This is especially true of ethical norms of the contractual type, as we have already shown. On this point, Professor Stevenson is unquestionably right when he says that it is of the essence of ethical values to be emotionally persuasive rather than cognitively conformative to social and cultural facts.<sup>15</sup>

Nevertheless ethical norms are empirically testable and therefore cognitive. The test is, however, not through their deductive or operational consequences with respect to society and culture but through their epistemological, and other philosophical, antecedents with respect to nature. It appears, therefore, that ethics and law neglect the rest of science and philosophy at their peril.

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<sup>15</sup>Stevenson, Charles L., *Ethics and Language*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1944.

## The Philosopher's Commitment\*

PHILIP BLAIR RICE

My topic is not one that I feel I know very much about; it is rather one that gives me recurrently an uneasy conscience. I have not chosen it, however, in order to embarrass you by a confession. My reason for discussing it on this occasion is that my own self-questionings are endemic to our calling. Such self-questionings confronted us at the outset of our professional life, they bob up to gnaw us in the midst of it, and we feel that they will come to plague or comfort us when toward the end we look back and try to balance the account. They spring from a doubt that besets alike the teacher, the scholar and the originator of new philosophic conceptions that shake an age. We encounter the question in the eyes of our students, our colleagues, and even at times our families—though these, in self-protection, learn not to ask it very often.

It is a question that is a nest of questions. But we can get into them by asking: What is the philosopher's commitment?

The key term in the question as I have phrased it, the term commitment, has become fashionable as a translation of the existentialists' word *engagement*. The existentialists have raised the question most insistently for current European thought, as have the pragmatists for American.

In seeking an answer, not only is it appropriate to the most venerable of the anniversaries we celebrate this year but it may otherwise be illuminating to start with a philosopher who has been a whipping boy for both the existentialists and the pragmatists. Like his master Socrates, Plato meditated the question of the philosopher's commitment; he was also a committed man and perhaps, as it will turn out, an engaged philosopher in a sense not wholly different from the existentialists' own.

Plato, as we know, held that the philosopher had a double commitment. The first and major commitment was to philosophy itself.

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This commitment was justified both in itself and by its consequences. Plato used all the arguments in the arsenal to establish his point, and they are so familiar that I need not repeat them. The language in which he celebrates the supreme value of the commitment to philosophy is that of religious conversion: a turning around of the eye of the soul from darkness to the sunlight.

But the philosopher, as an individual existent, cannot dwell perpetually in the sunlight of Pure Being. A creature that is born and dies, he is involved in Becoming, and so infected with relativity. From his commitment to philosophy follows, under these circumstances, another commitment: to fostering the conditions which in his time make possible the quest for wisdom and all other excellences. These conditions require from him sometimes participation, sometimes withdrawal. In the ideal commonwealth, and also, Plato gives us reason to infer, in any society that is not wholly inhospitable to the pursuit of ideal activities, the philosopher is obligated to descend into the cave and play his part in keeping the community going. He must apply such wisdom as he has lest wisdom perish. But if his society is hopelessly corrupt, and yet he manages through some accident such as exile or illness to catch a glimpse of the Sun of True Being, he can keep its gleam alive only by taking refuge beneath the shelter of a wall and philosophizing in solitude. To use another term that has a current vogue yet expresses Plato's notion exactly, the philosopher under these tragic circumstances will be *alienated* from his society, yet he will be able to practise philosophy at all only by maintaining this alienation. Those who have lived under a totalitarian regime, or who have tried to survive in one of the little pockets of militant absolutism in our own culture, will know with especial vividness what Plato means, and will also share his conclusion that the philosopher will inevitably be warped when he is thus excluded from participation in a community.

We cannot read Plato's glorious allegory today without a twinge of irony. Plato did not make philosophy easy, but the ascent from the cave may seem to us still rougher going than his account suggested. We have so much to learn in our century beyond the curriculum of the guardians, we are vexed by so many distractions, we are assailed by so many competing definitions of what philosophy is and even by doubts as to whether it is possible at all in any but a sense so modest and reduced that Plato's emotively charged language may seem exaggerated even when taken poetically. As one of my colleagues has put it, though we started out to become spectators of all time and all existence, there are moments when we would be willing to settle for

part-time and bare subsistence. But most of us are committed irrevocably—or at any rate until the Wittgensteinian therapy shall cure us. There are, furthermore, consummatory phases when Plato's lyrical celebration of the philosophic life seems as well justified as festive symbolism ever is in application to any complex and demanding human activity, for example the poet's eulogies of poetry; and it is considerably less factitious than most of the practical man's ritual glorifications of his ambiguous triumphs.

A sterner irony qualifies our response to Plato's description of the return to the cave. The readjustment of our sight to the realm of shadows, when we undertake the second commitment, is an even more difficult process than the conversion toward the sunlight. We are all sufficiently empirical minded today to find a touch of arrogance and condescension in Plato's assumption that the return to the cave is merely a descent, that we return only to bring the light and not to receive it. Our own experience takes us closer to the humility of Socrates: we can learn from cobblers, mechanics and even from the paranoid men, the managers of society, who seek power for its own sake.

What, then, shall we say about the double commitment in our time?

It is hard to explore this matter today without coming to terms with the philosopher who conceived himself to be the bad conscience of an age recently past, and who, if we read him, can trouble our own complacency. For even a self-doubting age such as our own finds new ways of becoming complacent. It is a long jump from the Son of Apollo to the Son of Dionysus, who in tones so burning that we cannot evade them, forces us to ask whether we should not put Plato's second commitment before his first. Such, at any rate, is the initial reverberation in us when Nietzsche summons us to become the philosophers of the future: "The philosopher as *we* understand him, we free spirits—as the man of all-embracing responsibility, who has the conscience for the general development of mankind. . . ."<sup>1</sup> The task of revaluing values requires the philosopher to create values. "*The real philosophers are commanders and law-givers*," they say: "Thus shall it be!" They determine first the Whither and the Why of mankind, and thereby dispose of the previous work of all philosophical laborers, and all subjugators of the past—they grasp at the future with a creative hand, and all that is and was becomes for them thereby a means, an

<sup>1</sup>*Beyond Good and Evil*, ch. 3, par. 61; *Werke* (Leipzig, 1930), v. 4, p. 72.

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instrument and a hammer. Their 'knowing' is *creating*, their creating is a law-giving. . . ."<sup>2</sup>

Nietzsche's trumpet call still has the power to disturb us, even though we reject many of his specific valuations, find fantastic some of his most prized doctrines such as the eternal recurrence, and are distressed by the terrible unclarity of the superman and the Will to Power. Two generations after Nietzsche it may well seem that the philosophers of the future have moved in, and in fact that some of them have already passed. The proper place for the thinker, said William James, is at the central point where the battle is being fought. Dewey has taught us that an idea is, in one of its functions, a blue print for action; and demonstrated his thesis in practice throughout a long lifetime. From mid-century Europe come echoes of Nietzsche that remain even closer to the language of the original. Writes Jean-Paul Sartre: ". . . That man is anguish means this: The man who engages himself and who realizes that he is not only the person that he chooses to be, but also a legislator who is choosing all mankind at the same time as himself, cannot escape the feeling of his total and deep responsibility. . . . There is no reality except in action."<sup>3</sup>

If we take such utterances out of context, it may appear that Plato's second commitment has not only taken priority over the first but submerged it. Yet whatever may be the case with some of their disciples, we find that each of these men, after the fashion of philosophers, produced explications and qualifications which prevent us from drawing any such simple conclusion. When we read Nietzsche attentively, we learn that Zarathustra is only one of his masks and not the commonest at that. The philosopher of the future will be something of "a poet and collector and traveller and riddle reader and moralist and seer and free spirit and almost everything else," but he is not any one of these nor a collection of them. He is, first of all, a philosopher, and cannot find to the legislation of values any short cut which will dispense with the kinds of tasks at which his predecessors called philosophers have toiled. He must "have trodden on all the steps on which his servants, the academic toilers of philosophy, stand and must remain standing."<sup>4</sup> Nietzsche was not recommending that we be something less than a philosopher as he is ordinarily conceived, but this and something more. If we point out that Nietzsche himself fell short in this commitment

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, ch. 6, par. 211; v. 4, p. 135.

<sup>3</sup>*L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme* (Paris, 1946), pp. 28, 55.

<sup>4</sup>*Op. cit.*, ch. 6, par. 211; v. 4, p. 134.

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as in many of the others that he demanded, he would readily have admitted it. For he had a broad streak of humility along with his stripes of arrogance, and declared himself to be not the philosopher of the future but merely his "herald and forerunner."<sup>5</sup>

Likewise the best of our own pragmatists conceive philosophy, in its distinctive role, to be something more than moralizing or social reform or practical politics, however much of these activities it may include within its scope. The doctrines of John Dewey, as well as the example of his personality, are too fresh within our memories to require any elaborate substantiation of this point. Although he held that all thinking starts from the immediate life-situation and achieves closure by returning to it, the characteristic domain of philosophy nevertheless is that phase of the process in which the most general ideas—ideas of method, of meaning, of nature, of value—are elaborated and tested. No philosophy can wholly escape being of its culture, yet its concern, he held, should be quite as much to break out of the limitations of that culture as to voice its assumptions. And we recall that Dewey on occasion found it necessary to chide his disciples among educationists—albeit too gently, as it may have seemed to some of us—for applying his doctrine that learning is doing in such a way as to ignore the emergence of a distinctively intellectual interest, so that the doing must include a performance of theoretical tasks. Dewey, we conclude, recognized both of Plato's commitments, however differently he conceived the relations between them.

Existentialism, with its catchword *engagement*, has appeared to stress the second or practical commitment at least as much as our pragmatists. This impression has been reinforced by the spectacular example of M. Sartre, busy novelist, tendentious playwright, editor, radio commentator and political pundit. But when we examine more closely Sartre's own doctrine of commitment, we find that here too the popular impression is exaggerated. So far as I can discover, Sartre has never advocated an engaged philosophy in exactly those terms. Such an advocacy is nevertheless implied in several of his more recent writings, including *What Is Literature?*, where he makes in this respect a sharp—and I believe an oversharpest—distinction between the poet and the prose writer. The poet, the musician, the painter and the sculptor are engaged only with their media; they are "inside" language or sounds or colors or shapes. The words of the poet are not "signs" of the world outside them; they constitute a "microcosm"; the poet is

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, ch. 2, par. 44; v. 4, p. 54.

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"absent" from the common world. The speaker or the prose writer, on the other hand, uses words as signs and thereby tries to get beyond them to the object they signify. He places himself in a "situation" which involves him with the great world, natural and social. Since most philosophy is written in prose rather than in verse, this involvement presumably applies to the philosopher as well as to the novelist and playwright; and indeed Sartre discusses several philosophers in this context. Unlike the poet, the prose writer is under obligation to *make sense*. (Such at any rate is M. Sartre's doctrine, whatever may be his performance.) There is considerable relativity, historical and personal, in the manner in which the prose writer carries out this obligation. For our own time, Sartre asserts, the special obligation imposed upon both the philosopher and the writer of fiction is "to rediscover the absolute in the bosom of relativity itself."<sup>6</sup>

The philosopher, we may infer, should carry out this commitment in a different fashion from, say, the novelist. As Sartre's own performance suggests, he holds that the characteristic commitment of the philosopher is to provide a doctrine of being. This is what he offered exhaustively and exhaustingly in *Being and Nothingness*. Everything is fluid except the basic ontological structures—being-in-itself, being-for-itself and being-for-others. There is no unchanging essence of human nature: what is universal and absolute is the human *condition*—man exercising his freedom in a world of things and of other selves. The philosopher's special job is to trace the general outlines of this condition. So, by his own erratic route, Sartre seems to have reached agreement with Plato that the philosopher's first commitment is to philosophy, and that philosophy's basic concern is with ontology. Beyond these points, nearly everything is different, except that the ancient Greek and the most modern of Frenchmen agree that the philosopher's practical commitments are relative to his personal and historical situation. Sartre, it would appear, shares Plato's opinion that there are situations in which the philosopher's commitment requires him to withdraw from the market place. He comments with approval, granted the circumstances, on the resolution of Descartes, in appearance the most disengaged of philosophers, to conquer himself rather than the world. When Sartre says that "there is no reality except in action," he goes on to explain that he is referring to the human reality, which consists in assigning a meaning to one's life; and the action by which one does this is simply the act of choice. Under certain circumstances

<sup>6</sup>"Qu'est-ce-que la Littérature," in *Situations II* (Paris, 1948), p. 245.

this may consist in refraining from overt action. Sartre has felt, of course, that his own situation has required him to take part in all sorts of activities in which he has sought to shape the course of events. But even here he has felt obliged to draw the line. He has steadfastly refused to join a political party, because he felt that thereby he would sacrifice his freedom of decision; and he has been the leader among French intellectuals of that "neutralism" which seeks, whether successfully or not, to avoid taking sides in the world struggle between Communism and its adversaries.

I am not concerned here to defend or to oppose Sartre's specific execution of his two commitments, though I suspect that like the rest of us he is often engaged where he should be disengaged, and vice versa. I am discussing him rather as a particularly striking illustration of the general point that, regardless of his starting point, any philosopher if he pursues one commitment very far learns that he must come to terms with both, and that he finds the relationship between them to be complicated and difficult to decipher. Nor is our direct concern with whether Plato diagnosed his specific commitments correctly in the Athens of 377 B.C. or Sartre's his in the Paris of 1946; but it is rather how we are to conceive our own commitments in St. Louis or Cambridge or Berkeley or Colletgetown, U.S.A., in 1953.

As to the theoretical commitment, that to philosophy itself. I don't see how we can discover in detail what it should be except by continuing to do the general kinds of things we are doing already in our professional capacities. This mild proposal need not entail complacency. We probably could do these things better than we are now doing them; and if we push them far enough, we shall find that some of them lead us into blind alleys and that we should turn to something else. We can't all of us be right—pragmatists, positivists, emergent materialists, phenomenologists, personalists, neo-Thomists, neo-Kantians, neo-Hegelians, neo-Wittgensteinians. Except when we are arguing with each other, we are aware that it is quite likely that none of us is altogether right and few of us are altogether wrong—though the proportions of rightness to wrongness may vary substantially from philosopher to philosopher. The only way we can find out how right we are and how wrong we are is to keep on doing the kinds of things we are impelled to do, maintaining if possible a lively interest in what other philosophers are doing, with as good temper as may be. We can be confident that in the usual course of things our errors will be refuted, or more likely forgotten, before they have had a chance to do much harm.

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My mild proposal, furthermore, needs to be reaffirmed more often than on ceremonial occasions such as this. For not only are there totalitarian regimes that threaten to suppress our commitment to philosophy, as so conceived, but there are authoritarian influences in our own society seeking to prescribe our conclusions and steer us by a short cut to the final truth. When we remember this, we become reconciled even to philosophical meetings, with their confusion of doctrines.

It is particularly important to keep alive the most acute conflict of the moment as to what the commitment to philosophy consists in—the conflict between analysts and speculative philosophers. It would be easy to document the thesis that philosophy from Socrates onward has thriven on the tension between two urges—the urge to be comprehensive and the urge to be clear. When the urge to be comprehensive has overwhelmed the urge to be clear, philosophy has become intellectually irresponsible and the way has been opened to all sorts of pretentious nonsense. When the urge to be clear has been in exclusive possession, the result has been triviality and pedantry. Both kinds of abuses are abundantly evident in our day. But attainment of the proper balance between the two urges is a moving target, and we must be tolerant of excesses in either direction, in the confidence that they tend to correct each other, and that a collective deviation to one side quickly produces a reaction.

Signs are indeed apparent in some quarters that speculative philosophy is becoming more analytical and analytic philosophy is becoming more speculative. After the self-questioning in matters of method and meaning that American and British philosophers have gone through in the past generation it is difficult to pursue ontological speculation with the semantic nonchalance that characterized much of idealist metaphysics or with the airy verbal legerdemain that is still common in certain quarters on the Continent of Europe and particularly among our existentialist brethren. On the other hand, there is evidence that linguistic analysts are coming to recognize that language is not a wholly autonomous realm and that problems of meaning cannot be clarified by remaining within the domain of language nor even within the joint domain of language and logic. For example, there is the tendency to reject the sharp distinction between the analytic and the synthetic which was the magic touchstone a few years ago for detecting and exploding nonsense. Language is acknowledged to be subject to double control. It is dependent on the structure and needs of the human beings who use it and thus subject to pragmatic considerations. It is also controlled by the structure of the existence to which it refers

and readjusts its forms to the developing patterns of experience. Thus the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic in most domains becomes a shifting and relative one. The progress of analysis itself has come up against a stone wall in the attempts to clarify such a concept as that of scientific law or such a grammatical form as that of the counter-factual conditional. The course of analytic philosophy has thus forced the recognition of certain existential categories not exhaustively expressible in terms of the assumptions peculiar to linguistic syntax and to formal logic. And from their side, some of the speculative philosophers are recognizing that language is not an instrument that can be used naively; propositions about existence are not independent of decisions as to the choice of the language used in expressing them, and language generates forms and criteria that have a partial autonomy. There is consequently pious hope of a convergence on the point where the distinction between speculative philosopher and analyst becomes blurred, and a foretaste of that millenium where the metaphysicians will talk sense and the semioticians will talk about something.

The current conflict between analysis and speculative philosophy is not correctly identified with the division between the two commitments, the theoretical and the practical. Both "analytic" and "speculative" methods may be applied to either of the two commitments. It is perhaps some of the analysts who in our time have most boldly proclaimed the autonomy of philosophy and its total independence of other human concerns. But the metaphysician can quite as easily withdraw to his model of the ebony tower as the analyst to his. Among some of the analysts themselves there is a disposition to recognize that the second commitment has been neglected. For example, Mr. Frankena in a recent article takes occasion "to lament the tendency of recent moral philosophers [of the analytical school] to avoid assuming the normative task of guiding human action," and recommends that ethical theory or metaethics itself can be improved by being carried out in conjunction with the making of normative judgments in various domains of life.<sup>7</sup>

An acknowledgment of the potential benefits to philosophical theory from practising normative ethics does not, of course, cancel the obligation of the philosopher under certain circumstances to withdraw into his ebony tower for long periods, or even in rare cases for a lifetime. There is an analogy here between the philosopher's ebony tower

<sup>7</sup>William K. Frankena, "Moral Philosophy at Mid-Century," *Philosophical Review*, v. 60, no. 1, p. 54.

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and the ivory tower of the poet, over which literary critics have disputed so much in the past few generations. In a widely read essay, Mr. Archibald MacLeish accused the poets of our time of being "irresponsibles." Yet one need not agree with M. Sartre that poetry is wholly "within language" and has no concern with the great world, in order to see the justice in those replies to Mr. MacLeish which have urged that under certain circumstances and for prolonged periods the poet—or some poets—must retire to the ivory tower if poetry is to survive at all. Such seems particularly to have been the case during stretches of the past century and a half, when the poet was bewildered by the assaults of science and of a rapidly developing industrial society upon his vocabulary and sensibility, and felt a compulsion to hold himself aloof and put his own house in order by reforging his language, imagery and forms. The resulting quest for a pure or compartmentalized poetry, however chimerical as a complete ideal, had its justification as a strategy relative to the needs of the cultural situation and yielded choice treasure.

In philosophy both as a collective undertaking and as a life-pursuit of the individual there must likewise be cycles of withdrawal and return. When, a bit earlier, I quoted James's stirring declaration that the proper place for the thinker is at the central point where the battle is being fought, there must have occurred to some of you the contrasting image of Hegel absorbedly writing the conclusion of his *Phenomenology* on the eve of the battle of Jena. If Hegel ignored that battle, how many others, for better or for worse, has he helped to engender during the past hundred years!

We must recognize what may be called, after a familiar model, the normative paradox: in order to be normative, the philosopher must sometimes forget about being normative. Or, to put it more accurately, he must lay aside other norms for the time being and devote himself to such norms as truth and clarity. Though clarity is scarcely a word we can use in this connection, an example of the general point comes to mind within current philosophies of existence themselves, where there is a major split between *existential* or ontological philosophies, such as Heidegger's, which seek to penetrate to the nature of being or existence in general, and philosophies called *existentiel*, or ontic, in which Heidegger includes Kierkegaard's and Jaspers', which reject this general ontological concern and devote themselves to describing particular "types" of existence or crisis situations of the individual. Although Heidegger has recently declared that his *Being and Time* is *erfolglos*, without consequences for ethics, nevertheless some of his

ontological doctrines, such as his distinction between authentic and inauthentic existence, are held by many of the interpreters of existentialism to have profounder implications for the contemporary European view of life than the more directly engaged investigations of Jaspers.

However distorted some of the insights of Heidegger and Sartre by local agonies of the contemporary European psyche, however warped from universality by dubious philosophical methods, the existentialist movement compels our attention by its persistent struggle to grasp and to convey the principal dimensions of the human condition. We shall probably not feel easy about it until our own philosophers have given us a more explicit expression than we have had of how existence feels and otherwise appears to us, and a map of the dominant lines of force in the pushes and pulls that existence exerts upon us. Such an undertaking would represent these from the American perspective, not because we are chauvinists but because we are here rather than somewhere else.

I would not attempt to prophesy in detail what such an American philosophy of existence would be like, nor to sketch its ontological categories. We have already had more than suggestions of some of its probable attitudes in our poets and novelists, and in our philosophers themselves, notably James, Dewey, Santayana and Whitehead; and we can extrapolate selectively from our national temper and our world situation.

It would not do to assume that an American existentialism would be wholly different from the European. We too have had responsibility forced upon us by the "situation," and we too have known anguish, both the anguish resulting from this responsibility and a more universal concern for the forms of our being expressed by Hawthorne, Melville and our alienated poets. But I think our existential philosophy would not be obsessed by absurdity nor take its point of departure from despair, even though it conceded clearsightedly to these their due place in the scheme of things. We shall cling stubbornly to as much of our meliorism as is compatible with an acknowledgement that in certain predicaments our only final recourse is to invoke the tragic sense of life. We have never, perhaps, believed very profoundly in the total perfectibility of man, but it will be hard to convince us that at least some of the major evils of life—including some of the horrors within ourselves—are not remediable by honest thought and hard effort. An existentialism adequate to our view of things would have to include a feel for the illumination shed by a scientific hypothesis that works,

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a sense of the extension of the self accomplished by a machine obedient to human needs, a recognition of the zest as well as the tedium inherent in settling conflicts by the decencies of the democratic process. It would, I hope, be tough in its attitudes toward matters of practice, tender in matters of sentiment, and expressive of the humor and lyricism of experience. From the nature of the enterprise, it would be religious in Tillich's sense of being permeated with ultimate concern. There is no reason why, along with a poetic and dramatic awareness of the push and pull of existence, such a philosophy should not also give us a logical analysis of the meanings of the word "to be." For although existence may not be in its profoundest abysses logical, it has generated logical forms that can serve us well if we do not abuse them, for example, as Heidegger and Sartre do, by playing conjuring tricks with the idea of negation.

I should like to make it clear that I am not proposing to found a school of American existentialism, and in fact there is reason to fear that an existential philosophy thus tempered in the direction of what seems to us reasonableness would lose much of its novelty and consequently its fascination. I have referred to philosophies of existence to illustrate the point that man is by nature a normative animal. Anything that he does sets an example, whether it be a good example or a bad one. Even the most abstract or "technical" pursuits of philosophers, those which in their main intention seem most remote from our immediate life-concerns, may nevertheless draw upon them and redirect them for the future. If we could find a solid doctrine of being on which to anchor our conception of man, or if we could find reliable techniques for exploding nonsense, even though these were thought out by men under no urgency from practical allegiances, the consequences would be momentous.

After we have made these concessions, and more, to such paradoxes as the hedonistic and the normative, after we have admitted that we must often

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we cannot take such paradoxes as expressing the whole truth of the matter. Hitting the target is at best a fortunate accident unless you at least cock an eye in its general direction. Consequently, if the philosopher admits an obligation, under certain circumstances, to agitate the market place, he cannot count on finding its range by remaining in the ebony tower and looking occasionally through a spyglass to see if he has chanced to disturb the flow of traffic.

The philosopher's practical commitment has ultimately the same justification, or lack of justification, that any commitment of any person has. It goes back to our general ethical principles, or even further to the working assumptions underlying these principles and rooted in the Platonic Eros, the ineradicable normativeness of the human creature. Man is an animal that cares. If we care for certain ends, that care commits us to the means for their realization. On the specific question, we perhaps cannot surpass Plato's insight. By his professional commitment, the philosopher has a lifelong concern for Truth and Justice. He perceives that Truth and Justice by themselves cannot prevail, that they must be supported by a structure of Power; that Power sought for its own sake corrupts, and hence that the great and almost insoluble practical problem is to create a self-maintaining structure of Power set up in such a way that its end will be not in itself but in its subordination to Truth and Justice. Such a structure can be achieved only by a rule of just law devised and administered by men educated to love Wisdom and Justice. The shortcomings in Plato's account of this justification, from our own perspective, lay: first, in his failure to see that Power could not be kept subordinate to Truth and Justice when all but a few were excluded from participation in Power; and second, in his quite understandable inability to predict the enormous amount of specialization required in our time to develop either the theoretical skills required of the philosopher or the practical skills required of the wielders of Power.

It is this latter consideration which makes us hesitate to ascribe to philosophers in our own day an unconditional obligation to seek to participate in the structure of Power in a direct way or on the large scale that Plato envisaged as the ideal. We must usually be content with trying to do our immediate professional jobs conscientiously and honestly, and beyond that taking part in a small way as men and as citizens in the life going on about us. Even here our expectations must be tempered by a saving irony. If one lapse into the autobiographical is permitted me, I must confess that I am doubtful whether in a number of years of dabbling in local politics I have materially influenced the policies of my party or changed more than a few score of votes, unless it be to have driven them over to the other side. Any substantial benefits from my flyer into practical politics must be sought in the possible modification of my political philosophy in the direction of greater realism. Whether such benefits outweigh the loss to my philosophy through the distraction involved is a question on which I am undecided.

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But generalization from such a modest example as my own would be hasty. Some of our colleagues have done better: within the not too recent past they have served as ambassador or as congressman or as representative of the State Department; and some European and Asian philosophers, living in cultures with less hostility to intellectuals, have risen to even higher office.

Making allowance for such rare exceptions, however, such direct practical influence as philosophers can exercise will normally spring from their setting examples of courage and integrity in meeting local challenges that their consciences will not let them evade. As a profession, our direct contributions will be outweighed by our indirect practical effect through our pupils, our writings, and our perennial role as gadflies on the flanks of specialists. Sometimes we can trace these results clearly as in the influence of John Locke on the framers of our government or in the influence of James and Dewey on Justices Holmes and Cardozo. Most commonly the effect is less tangible; it is the collective and largely anonymous influence of a profession that from day to day tries to maintain standards of honest learning, courageous thinking and conscientious teaching—all these tinged with human concern. There are signs that these things themselves are being increasingly threatened, in ways blatant and subtle, by the hysterical atmosphere into which we are moving; and it is possible that much of our energy for a while will be absorbed simply by keeping these things alive—honest learning, courageous thinking and conscientious teaching. If so, no other moral or social commitment of the philosopher can take priority over this.

When the philosopher does aim directly at being normative, he will usually not have most to say about concrete legislation or other particular issues in practical affairs, for he does not often have the necessary facts at his disposal—though he should not be considered less qualified than the rest of the citizenry when he does have the facts. For these days we have to be somewhat practical in order to live on our salaries—or our wives do. But the philosopher's greatest competence in the practical domain will probably continue to lie on the borderline between his perennial concerns and the more radical or general areas of perplexity arising from other domains of human endeavor. All this implies some such conception of the social and moral role of philosophy as that which Cassirer found to have constituted the strength of the philosophy of the Enlightenment. By this conception, Cassirer writes, philosophy "is no special field of knowledge situated beside or above the principles of natural science, of law and

government, etc., but rather the all-comprehensive medium in which such principles are formulated, developed and founded. Philosophy is no longer to be separated from science, history, jurisprudence and politics; it is rather to be the atmosphere in which they can exist and be effective."<sup>8</sup>

The ways in which philosophers can exercise directly or indirectly a normative role are as various as the men, the opportunities and the demands that the age provides. Besides those I have just indicated there is time to discuss only one. This is the role of the philosopher that Nietzsche urged upon us. This role is so demanding, so dizzying, that we are hesitant to consider it; nevertheless we can't entirely down the question to what extent an approximation to it is possible in our time. "For the task of a revaluation of values," Nietzsche said, "perhaps more capacities were needed than have ever dwelt together in an individual; also, above everything, contrasts of capacities, without allowing them to disturb, destroy one another. Hierarchy of capacities; distance; the art of separating without antagonizing; mix nothing, 'reconcile' nothing; an enormous multiplicity which is nevertheless the opposite of chaos—this was the prerequisite, the long, secret labor and artistry of my instinct."<sup>9</sup>

So Nietzsche characterized the rare combination of qualities necessary for this task. The acquisition of these qualities he held to be all but impossible even when he wrote three quarters of a century ago. These are a few of his reasons: "The scope and tower building of the sciences has grown monstrously, and therewith the probability that the philosopher becomes tired while still a learner, or lets himself be caught and 'specialized' somewhere: so that he never comes to his summit at all, namely to the survey, general view, downward view. Or he gets there too late, when his best time and energy are already past; or damaged, coarsened, degenerated so that his vision, his total value judgment, means little any more. Precisely the acuteness of his intellectual conscience may make him hesitate and be delayed along the way; he fears the temptation to be a dilettante. . . ."<sup>10</sup>

But the modesty, the sense of our own limitations, which makes us reluctant even to contemplate such a role, is somewhat overcome when

<sup>8</sup>Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* (Princeton, 1951), p. vii.

<sup>9</sup>*Ecce Homo*, "Why I Am So Clever," sec. 9; *Werke*, v. 5, p. 331; as translated by G. A. Morgan, Jr., *What Nietzsche Means* (Cambridge, Mass., 1943), p. 31.

<sup>10</sup>*Beyond Good and Evil*, ch. 6, par. 205; *Werke*, v. 4, p. 121; tr. Morgan, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34.

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we realize that if the philosopher shrinks from playing the part, people who may be even less qualified will jump in and usurp it: the preacher, the newspaper columnist, the college president, the anthropologist, the sociologist, the psychiatrist, the literary man. People in these professions tend to be less deterred by scruples as to their own competence to affirm and criticize values than the philosopher. And yet there is a persisting and quite legitimate demand that someone—and most likely a variety of people—undertake this function.

In the past, except when there were prophets and saints—who are not abundant in our day—it was usually either the philosopher or the literary man who came nearest to grasping the pattern of valuations of the age and remolding it. In Victorian England, for example, the twin figures of John Stuart Mill and Matthew Arnold at once come to mind. Leading men of letters in Europe are still expected to try to perform this role, whether they be Thomas Mann, Eliot, Malraux, Sartre or Camus. The Germans have a word for it—*Schriftsteller*; and the French a phrase—*directeur de conscience*.

Recently a visiting European intellectual, a man of letters on a tour of this country, said that he had been trying to find, among our many interesting novelists and poets, some one writer whom he could recommend to his fellow-countrymen as representative of American culture at its best and as voicing the aspirations and the values which are helping to shape our society. He said that he was unable to find one. Our outstanding writers, such as Faulkner, Hemingway and the others most read by Europeans, do not seem well qualified to perform this role—though my European acquaintance made a partial exception in the case of Hemingway's *Old Man and the Sea* and Faulkner's Nobel Prize speech. In fact, such writers are more likely to be taken by Europeans as witnesses to spiritual and moral decay. The European said that he had already seen enough of our culture to be aware that this European notion—derived not only from their misreading of our serious writers but from our movies, our tourists, our soft drinks and the *Reader's Digest*—was incorrect, that the United States was not a technological monster, that it was neither barbarous nor decadent (though I think we ourselves would concede that it contains sizable spots of both barbarism and decadence). But he still had difficulty in recommending to other Europeans any one American writer or philosopher, or even a set of them, who would adequately represent the genuine originality and vitality that he himself sensed in our culture. The Americans with whom he was talking suggested to him a few of our men of letters—critics as well as poets and novelists—who could

partially fill the bill. As to philosophers, we could only express the opinion that our two great men who died in the last year, Dewey and Santayana, in their quite different ways went a considerable distance toward offering us a revaluation of values for their times and that we are perhaps far from having exhausted all that was usable in either of them. We were unable to point to an American philosopher who in the 1950's was playing quite the same part that these two figures played for their own generations.

The remarks I have just made might seem to require that I conclude with an exhortation. But the need in question is scarcely one that can be supplied on demand. It is one that can be filled if at all only by the unforeseeable emergence of genius, evoked by its own compulsions and not by pleading upon an official occasion. The most we can do, perhaps, is to point wistfully, from time to time, to the need and the opportunity, and beyond that resolve not to stifle the development of such talents if they are manifested in our students or our colleagues, but rather to encourage it.

By way of general conclusion, I should like to suggest simply that just as philosophy thrives on the tension between analytic and speculative philosophy, so it flourishes also on the conflict between the theoretical commitment and the practical commitment. Collectively, at any rate, philosophy thrives on these tensions, although the individual philosopher may be defeated by wavering between the two poles, for tension may be either tonic or disorganizing. But their proper balance is a problem for the individual and one for whose solution no general formula can be offered.

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## On Judging History\*

E. W. STRONG

In the year 445 B.C., Herodotus was awarded a prize of ten talents by the citizens of Athens to whom he had been reading his *History*. Its publication was thus deemed an event worth honoring. When we now read the *History*, we do so in the consciousness that we cannot confer any benefit upon its author which he can enjoy. Had his book perished also, those happenings in the past made known to us only through its pages would be gone irrevocably. Even if knowledge of happenings were not lost because preserved in other records or recoverable from them, the loss of the book would still deprive us of the art with which Herodotus tells a great story and of his thought in interpreting and valuing that portion of the past about which he writes. This history book, like every other, keeps remembrance alive so long as it survives and, in survival, is read. Unread histories on a shelf are just as dead as the lost history of Timaeus of Tauromenium although they may be revived in experience whereas a history destroyed cannot. In measure of desire to have his representation live on, a historian will desire also to have his work so wrought that readers will continue to seek it out. Herodotus polishing the language and style of his history was not adding to the store of knowledge in it, but he was exercising care to realize the hope expressed in its opening words: "These are the researches of Herodotus of Halicarnassus, which he publishes, in the hope of thereby preserving from decay the remembrance of what men have done, and of preventing the great and wonderful actions of the Greeks and the Barbarians from losing their due meed of glory; and withal to put on record what were their grounds of feud."

Another Greek, Dionysius by name and also of Halicarnassus, praised Herodotus above Thucydides. Herodotus, he held, was the more successful "in the first and really essential business of a historian," the business, "no matter what his vein may be, of choosing a good subject which will give pleasure to his readers." Our modern historians

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\*Presidential address delivered before the twenty-sixth annual meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association at the University of Southern California, December 29, 30, 31, 1952.

would say rather that the first and really essential task of a historian is to make history as nearly a science as he can. Between Herodotus and the modern we meet with many and diverse valuations of the role and worth of historical study. Each historian has some idea of history and some purpose which he thinks history can or should fulfill. Just as other makings of which we have record become subjects of histories about them, so these makings of written histories have given rise to historical accounts which have history as their subject. The artifacts which have survived are the sources from which the events and procedures of their making are reconstructed. Shotwell's *History of History*, as a typical example, seeks to ascertain what historical thought has been in contexts and courses, to represent how and why historians were occupied with purposes expressed or implied in their work, and to assess the significance and worth of their contributions.

To write a history of historiography requires a working definition of the subject under investigation and exposition. The definition to be satisfactory should not exclude works which men in other times and places have considered to be history. As a suitable, common denominator, we might agree that a history is at least an oral or written account conveying some knowledge of when and where something happened. This or other identification of subject for the purpose of writing a history of historiography does not supply or presuppose an identical reason in all historians for seeking knowledge about the past. Indeed, it would be astonishing if history were the exception among arts in not exhibiting changes in organizing idea, or if it were the exception among disciplines and sciences in not developing through inventions and discoveries.

Shotwell writing about Herodotus who wrote about the Spartans fighting and dying in the pass at Thermopylae might seem to be twice-removed from once-actual events. In parallel with Plato's description of the painter in the *Republic*, Book X, Herodotus is the copier of the original whereas Shotwell is producing a copy of a copy. Yet Shotwell is not more removed from Herodotus than Herodotus is removed from the Spartan action so far as relation of narration to subject is concerned. Herodotus writing his history is no less an event than Spartans fighting and dying. Only if Shotwell were writing on the same subject as Herodotus and relying at second-hand upon his predecessor's researches would be he producing history twice-removed. When, in course of time, a historian undertakes to write a history of

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the histories of historiography written by Shotwell and others, he will be at first removed from these viewed as events.

Historians writing history of historiography make value judgments in assessing significance and worth of histories as they have been written. They have then to decide by what criteria of task and fulfillment the judging proceeds in asserting success or failure. How is the measure furnished by which a present-day historian praises predecessors for doing what they should have done, or censures them for shortcomings? The question would not be asked if it were not supposed that historians have responsibilities to be met in study and writing of history. Yet who is in a position to speak with finality about predecessors by possessing value-criteria universally applicable? Short of exhibiting, as historians of historiography have not, that historians have always sought the same end in the same way for the same purpose, how is transcendence of many perspectives and of accompanying relativity of valuing attainable? Pieter Geyl, in *Napoleon For and Against*, finds diversity and lack of finality to be unavoidable.

The scientific method serves above all to establish facts; there is a great deal about which we can reach agreement by its use. But as soon as there is a question of explanation, of interpretation, of appreciation, though the special method of the historian remains valuable, the personal element can no longer be ruled out, that point of view which is determined by the circumstances of his time and by his own preconceptions. Every historical narrative is dependent upon explanation, interpretation, appreciation. In other words we cannot see the past in a single, communicable picture except from a point of view, which implies a choice, a personal perspective. It is impossible that two historians, especially two historians living at different periods, should see any historical personality in the same light.

Of the many ideas of task and fulfillment, some are compatible and some are not, some recur or persist while others do not; but of disagreement there has never been ending. The didactic aim of Tacitus has fallen into disrepute—the aim expressed by that moralistic historian in saying, “My purpose is not to relate at length every act, but only such as were conspicuous for excellence or notorious for infamy. This I regard as history’s highest function, to let no worthy action be uncommemorated and to hold out the reprobation of posterity as a terror to evil words and deeds.” In its stead, marked by Harry Elmer

Barnes as the first great advance which came into history writing in the nineteenth century, is the abandonment "of all attitudes which put any aim or purpose in the writing of history beyond, or in conflict with, the calm and dispassionate exposition of facts in any particular situation, in so far as they may be obtainable." The utility of history prized by Polybius and Machiavelli as education of men for practical life from examples and precedents drawn from past politics has also become suspect or is rejected outright. Thus Shotwell writes of Polybius, "A historian who is avowedly intent on the lessons history supplies would be given short shrift today in the courts of historical criticism"; and Langlois and Seignobos declare, "It is an obsolete illusion to suppose that history supplies information of practical utility in the conduct of life." Usefulness, where still championed, wears other than its old pragmatic face. Holding that "The great achievement of history is to develop and perfect and arm conscience," Lord Acton discloses the spring of his conviction in these words: "The inflexible integrity of the moral code is to me the secret of the authority, the dignity and the utility of history." Arguing that instrumentality of a historian's work is an issue which cannot be avoided, Salvemini avers that, "Directly or indirectly, all historical research aims at solving the basic problem of how some present situation has come to be as it is."

An ideal of a pure history comparable to a pure science, at least in spirit and method of inquiry, leads to depiction by Edward P. Cheney of the kind of historian thought most desirable for adherence to the ideal. He is the detached man who "can look upon his subject as simply a body of facts, to be investigated and described for their own sake; not with a view of drawing a lesson from them, not with a view of praising or blaming anyone, not with a view of so choosing and putting the facts as to give emotional pleasure to the reader,—not, in fact with any ulterior motive whatever; but simply to take human history as his object of study,—just as one might take any other group of phenomena." Against the thought that subjectivity might enter in interpretation, we have the assurance conveyed by Albert J. Beveridge: "Facts when justly arranged interpret themselves. They tell the story." An almost inhuman impartiality of history the science in accumulating evidence and in presenting accounts of the past is taken by some to be an actual accomplishment, by others a goal "no matter how unrealizable in practice."<sup>1</sup> Both presumed accomplishment and professed goal are

<sup>1</sup>Louis Gottschalk, *Understanding History*, New York (1950), p. 279. Gottschalk says that the historian "respectful of the scientific spirit" will make a conscious

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challenged by Bury. He had, in his inaugural address in 1903, maintained that "History is a science, no less and no more." But, in a letter on the writing of history dated 1926, he has this to say: "It seems to be always assumed as self-evident and universally admitted that impartiality and freedom from bias are indispensable qualifications of every Historian's idea of how history should be written. Here I totally disagree, I do not think freedom from bias is possible, and I do not think it is desirable." H. C. S. Lambert does not think that historians can stand outside problems of human affairs in the same way in which physical scientists can be neutral or indifferent about physical phenomena. "It is a mistake to imagine that the historian must not take sides, for if it is his deliberate and carefully considered judgment that one side was right, it is his duty to say so."

From C. M. Destler writing on "Contemporary Historical Theory" comes the judgment that we have "history as an increasingly mature, empirical discipline, ever more capable of deriving from within itself necessary standards of relevance and criticism to direct and evaluate its work." From Allan Nevins in *The Gateway of History* we hear that "Every strongly-individual historian sets up his own standards, and few historians of the first rank will admit that a different conception of historical aims is as good as their own." With these discordant voices sounding in our ears, what reason have we to believe that historical thought can transcend historicity—transcend, that is, the situational manyness of purposes and roles in which historians have cast their tasks in the study and writing of history. Unless a way of escape is shown, historians are not now entitled, any more than their predecessors, to lay claim to universality and finality in judging how history should be written. They are not entitled to read off the modern appraisal as more than that.

Two alternative ways of escape are available to historians willing to turn to speculative philosophy for rescue. They may embrace either a Platonic transcendence in recourse to the doctrine that man has an unchanging nature, or an Hegelian transcendence in recourse to the

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effort to lean over backward against his own biases. "In this connection, Lo-d Acton's instruction to the contributors to the *Cambridge Modern History* remains a goal, no matter how unrealizable in practice: to write as if established 'in Long. 30° W.'—that is, in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean in complete social isolation." On page 10, however, Gottschalk writes: "The historian cannot avoid, and therefore it is better that he should be openly committed to, some philosophy and some code of ethics."

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

doctrine that historical development has come to maturity and can now be comprehended in its reason for being. Speculative theory of history, however, has been indicted by scientific historians and banished by edict from the premises of scientific history. Some historians and philosophers after examining the premises, have concluded that no alternative remains to historical thought except that which avows the inescapability of perspectives of judging. Having come to this conclusion myself, I must own up here to being a historical relativist. It is not theory about historical work but a verified proposition about it that historians exhibit changing standpoints and perspectives from which selections are made and interpretations are cast up. This being so, relativity of normative judging is simply a concomitant of historical pluralism. To impose a doctrinal relativism *a priori* upon historians' works by which to construe them is no ambition of mine. If the voices of historians were concordant, or if discord were only appearance masking a real unity lying beneath or above diversity, I own no doctrinal or metaphysical faith by which this would not be as welcome as the opposite.

Relativity does not enter from without as an agent foreign to history, but is native with respect to meanings and values. Facts, however, are not relativistic but positivistic. They stand as securely as the evidence upon which they are established. The positivistic character of facts, however, extends only as far as there is agreement about the evidence and about what the evidence will support. It does not, and cannot, dictate one idea or one purpose as alone proper to historical inquiry in its institution and constitution to the exclusion of others. Deliverance of factual information from the reign of relativism is not deliverance also of selection and interpretation. Nor is there deliverance by appeal to the nature of history itself in hope thereby of showing the doctrinal or doctrinaire complexion of relativism and hence its scientific disreputability. Appeal can only be made to histories. Were there, as verified hypothesis, a unity of idea, purpose, nature, spirit, or reason of history to be traced sequentially through the myriad of historians from Herodotus to Shotwell, then Shotwell in judging Herodotus, could declare the verdict to be not just his own, or just an appraisal of Herodotus from the modern standpoint, but rather the verdict of history. Yet this is Hegelian doctrine, a speculative thesis and not a verified hypothesis. If asserted as the truth about histories in their production, it is a truth by metaphysical fiat and not by corroboration supplied by historical study. If asserted as a dramatic

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unity by which to depict history as having the role of Odysseus traveling a long way through trials and tribulations before arriving home, the dramatization remains cognitively innocent only so long as the abstraction involved is not turned into a substance or power.

Undeniably, there are as many particular progresses to be traced out as there are identifiable courses of development in directions desired or towards ends preferred. Where historians detect a clustering of strands, there is a period or age to be named by what is thought to characterize the cluster. Where historians detect a converging of strands, there is a movement to be named—a rebirth, a revolution, a reformation, or a culmination. Strands compatible for awhile cease to be so in becoming mutually inhibitive or destructive. Every clustering or converging of particulars is itself a particular collocation persisting for awhile in some area in some determinate way. Where historians detect the currency and context of Thucydides' purpose in writing history, they are so far enabled to judge his success or failure in his own terms. This is retrospective judging from within. A quite different retrospective judging is operative when they ask whether or not Thucydides satisfies what would be wanted of him were he writing today for us. This is retrospective judging working from without.

These two kinds of judging are commonly recognized by historians. Each constitutes a special claim and each can be advanced independent of the other. We need not inquire about the aim of the maker in the thing made to judge how well it serves us now in our interests and according with our measure of excellence. Nor need we raise the question of whether or not it suits us now to comprehend ways in which a written history or other artifact was understood and appreciated by men in the past. For this judging from within, we must seek out the interests resident in these others and the measures of excellence they use. When the judging from without and from within has been carried through in a history of historiography, nothing more remains to be done that can be done unless resort is had to Hegelian or to Platonic transcendence. The Hegelian transcendence seeks to save history by philosophy working from within. The Platonic transcendence seeks to free philosophy from history, but offers to history an insight from without by which to achieve a timeless unity of consciousness.

Hegel posits an immanent, imperishable Reason or Spirit progressing by a strife of opposites through a sequence of peculiar, determinate situations to realize the purpose of history, human freedom. To each

moment is allowed all that is individual, limited, and idiosyncratic while it holds the stage and plays out its passion; yet such is the cunning of Reason that the rational purpose of history is always furthered though there be no intent of individual actor or agent to do so. Each individual comes under a double judgment. In the run, he has the status and reputation he enjoys among his contemporaries in what pleases or vexes them. Thereafter his reputation is delivered into the hands of biographers and historians who represent him from their own successive and changing standpoints. Each judgment for its maker may have an absolute imperativeness of need, desire, and demand; but each turns out to be relative because partial and situational. At the end of the run, these relative judgments in their theses and antitheses are assigned their fixed places and values by a final judgment. Were it only Hegel, the individual, who does the assigning, his own account of the relativity of individual judging would force the conclusion that we have here only another particular standpoint with its perspective. Hegel, however, proclaims that it is not he who speaks but the World-Historical Spirit come at long last to full consciousness in Hegel and speaking through him.

In the "Introduction" to his *Philosophy of History*, Hegel declares that the only thought brought by philosophy to history is the conception that reason rules the world. In the body of the work, philosophy of history exhibits the teleological development of the idea of freedom through changing scenes and in the sequence of world-historical societies from East to West. At the end, the total self-development of history stands revealed as essentially God's work. Philosophy itself "escapes from the weary strife of passions that agitates the surface of society into the calm regions of contemplation."

Far more characteristic of philosophers than Hegel's marriage of philosophy to history has been the Platonic separation of the two. History has no place among the higher studies prescribed by Plato for the education of philosophical students. Rather history is part of "the literature of common life" and possesses, unlike legend, knowledge of facts about the past. What competence, though, has history for telling the truth about human life? The suspicion voiced by Socrates in the *Republic* is not that this kind of literature lacks facts but that it misinterprets them. "I suspect, we shall find both poets and prose-writers guilty of the most serious misstatements about human life, making out that wrongdoers are often happy and just men miserable; that injustice pays if not detected; and that my being just is to

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another man's advantage, but a loss to myself. We shall have to prohibit such poems and tales and tell them to compose others in the contrary sense? Don't you think so?"

The young man questioned by Socrates replies, "I am sure of it." He is sure, as Schopenhauer and many another philosopher have been, that historical knowing by the very nature of its objects must be an infirm and inferior kind of knowing. Historians as such have no access to the unchangeably real—the being, eternal and universal, of patterns which constitute the rational architecture of the sensible world. Their knowing courses with the many and changing. Although they authenticate documents and establish facts, their narrations do not advance to a predictive science for lack of laws nor to philosophy for lack of real principles. Histories trace out becoming of perishable things through contingencies and circumstances. The deeds and actions told about are unobservable after the event, and hence must be reconstructed from whatever survives to testify or bear witness to that which was once-actual. Like the events narrated in histories, the historians themselves lie in a temporal series with further histories to be written as there are further consequences giving rise to changed perspectives upon antecedents. Their writers do not escape particularity to have comprehension of the general and the universal either in mounting by history to philosophy, or in the Hegelian expedient of having philosophy reside in history. They cannot mount because, as Schopenhauer put it, they co-ordinate particulars only and do not subordinate them under generic ideas. As for importing philosophy into history, this does violence to both. Schopenhauer thus describes the direct opposition between them:

While history teaches us at every time that something else has been, philosophy tries to assist us to the insight that at all times exactly the same was, is, and shall be. In truth, the essence of human life, as of nature in general, is given complete in every present time, and therefore only requires depth of comprehension in order to be exhaustively known. But history hopes to make up for depth by length and breadth; for it every present time is only a fragment which must be supplemented by the past. . . . Upon this rests the opposition between philosophical and historical minds; the former want to go to the bottom, the latter want to go through the whole series.

In short, history "creeps along the ground of experience." It knows the individual only and of the individual there is no science.

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Having put history in its inferior place as knowledge, Schopenhauer concludes by extending to those who write and read history the insight of philosophy. The value of history is not as means to a scientific knowledge of man, but as end in an æsthetic contemplation. The human race attains in knowledge of its own past to a "reflected consciousness." There are writers of history who have, like makers of other artifacts, produced monuments contributing to "unity of the consciousness of humanity." They had desire and intent to speak to posterity in perpetuity. They succeeded in their aim of producing epitomes of man for all men in fastening upon an identical element permanent through all change. This identical element is human nature in its fixed, fundamental, and inalterable qualities.

Writing serves to restore unity to the consciousness of the human race, which is constantly interrupted by death, and therefore fragmentary; so that the thought which has arisen in the ancestor is thought out by his remote descendants; it finds a remedy for the breaking up of the human race and its consciousness into an innumerable number of ephemeral individuals, and so bids defiance to the ever hurrying time, in whose hand goes forgetfulness.

Akin to Schopenhauer's answer of what history is for, is the answer of Collingwood in saying that history is for human self-knowledge. "The value of history . . . is that it teaches us what man has done and thus what man is." Shotwell, too, honors the insight, imagination, and narrative art by which some historical works not only remain unsurpassed, but are unarrayable in a single, traceable line of development. He avers that the histories of Herodotus and Thucydides stand, like the Parthenon, "models for all time."

With the appreciation of history limned by Schopenhauer, Collingwood, and Shotwell I can go only part way. That part acknowledges æsthetic pleasure in the reading of a moving tale well told, reflected consciousness or self-knowledge as fruit of vicarious experience, and historical immortality sought by makers in and through things made to mean in perpetuity. How, though, is there unity of consciousness of the race? Sympathetic or histrionic recreation of another's thought is not identically that thought. The rethinking of other historians' ideas and purposes, questions and answers, presented by Collingwood in his *Idea of History*, is never anything more in the judging of them than either a particular judging from within or from without. We know from him what he appraises the comprehensions to have been

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which historians had of their task in times past, and have from him appraisals of their ideas and performances from a modern standpoint. We do not extract from these judgments what history *is*, or from history, what man *is*, if by this is meant an unchanging identity of each.

The answers Collingwood gives to the questions of what history is, what it is about, how it proceeds, and what it is for are such as he thinks "any present-day historian would accept." How, though, is the temporal qualification to be read off? Interpreted in Hegelian fashion, present-day comprehension consists of the matured consciousness and fulfilled reason of historiography. For example, Shotwell writes that "history the science has a development and logical history of its own. Paralleling other scientific work it has come to the front in our own age." Our scientific history is the "modern fulfilment of the old Greek *historia*," and progress of scientific history from beginning to fruition is the "central thread" of the story told in Shotwell's *History of History*.

Interpreted in the platonizing fashion of Schopenhauer, present-day comprehension is ephemeral in act; but, cognizant of inalterable qualities of the human heart and mind, it attains a timeless insight into a timeless unity of consciousness. This is not by cumulative development providing a privileged position in time to our present as contrasted with all those presents preceding. Herodotus did not have to wait until our day to be wise in his own in a work not superseded in art. "If one has read Herodotus," writes Schopenhauer in his essay *On History*, "then in a philosophical regard one has already studied history enough. For everything is already there that makes up the subsequent history of the world: the efforts, action, sufferings, and fate of the human race as its proceeds from the qualities we have referred to, and the physical earthly lot."

Read off by a historical relativist, present-day comprehension is the understanding, interpreting, and valuing from a vantage ground. This is not the ground of fulfillment of a single, master purpose nor the ground of insight into timeless unity. Rather, the very preoccupation with historical studies—studies more specialized and professionalized in our time than in any preceding—constitutes a standpoint and perspective upon the work of predecessors. Characteristic of the comprehension of our day is history of historiography with its perspective of perspectives. Shotwell exhibits such characteristic in remarking quite justly, "It was obviously impossible for Herodotus to write history as we do now. The question is whether he used *his* methods successfully." Again, speaking of Thucydides, "our interest in the world he

described is different from that which stirred in Thucydides. . . . The tale he tells is not what we wish most to hear."

The histories of Herodotus and Thucydides stand unsuperseded not as models for all time nor as revealing unchanging human nature, but as irreplaceable perspectives. Had they not written their histories we could otherwise know about the conflicts they narrate, but we would not have the meanings and values of the content through their eyes. Irreplaceable also are the artifacts, the works of literature. Their histories stand as objects yielding satisfactions to readers for those times and in those ways and from those interests in which readers seek out histories. To write as well as Herodotus can indeed be a continuing or a recurring aim, but to imitate him is aim only so long as that conception of art persists.

History of historiography exhibits historians intent on being moralists teaching by experience and precedent; intent on having their work serve as guide to action or as instrument for deciding policy; intent on telling a great story in an appropriate style; intent on illustrating, exemplifying, and epitomizing to bring home some purpose or reason; intent on accuracy and thoroughness of account in telling what happened just as it happened. None of the historians written about and none of the historians writing possesses vision and measure from a time-free perspective by which to judge histories absolutely. Histories need not be rewritten in facts established where these are not thereafter called into question. They are not superseded in perspectival contributions which they alone make nor as works of art. But histories are rewritten as questions not hitherto asked arise. They are rewritten as further consequences continuous with preceding affairs lead to recasting of their role and importance. Need to understand and to appreciate inheritance from the past in the light of a new, a changed, or a cumulative outlook and interest prompts historians to retraverse familiar ground with a fresh purpose. Findings and theories advanced by scientists thought applicable in explanation of known events afford accruing possibilities to be explored. A crisis-situation, a new route of inquiry, a shift in valuation of humanistic in relation to scientific studies, an alteration of world view, or a cultural revolution can turn men to tasks in historiography not envisaged by predecessors.

Acts of thought requisite for reconstructing the human past have their sources and conditions in whatever constitutes a present need to understand, appreciate, utilize, commemorate, and construe what was said and done. "Historical works of all times and of all peoples have

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come to birth in this manner and always will be born like this, out of fresh requirements which arise, and out of the perplexities involved in these. We shall not understand the history of men of other times unless we ourselves are alive to the requirements which that history satisfied, nor will successors understand the history of our time unless they fulfil these conditions." Croce, in these words, speaks both of the new and the renewed. Into constitution of present needs and requirements enters whatever is drawn from materials conserved from the past, or carried forward in continuation of action and process. It pertains to historical inquiry to search out similarities and recurrences no less than to attend to individual differences and singular strands.

The inquirer stands within problems of historical reconstruction but not as one so trapped within his present that currencies and contexts of past activities in their purposes cannot be known for what they were. He stands within his problems of human affairs in the sense that they interest him and elicit his valuations in a culturally determinate way. His inquiry, as purposive activity, is means to ends for which he publishes. The published history will be of intrinsic worth to readers when enjoyed for inherent qualities. It will be instrumental so far and so long as readers find some consonance between past issues told about and those with which their own lives are engaged. The utility of historical knowledge for action is entirely prospective. The more a known past is either discontinuous with the present or dissimilar to it, the less useful will be the knowledge of that past and of the judgments of success and failure. Retrospective praise or dispraise of dead men in their purposes and deeds is entirely gratuitous unless the appraisals relate to something thought worth carrying forward or worth avoiding. Dead historians are indifferent to the reputations we give them. Their histories too, except for intrinsic worth, are impotent if no longer having an active role to play. Some histories, once instrumental, become costume pieces and curiosities.

Just as only those facts relevant to a problem in its solution are evidence for investigation of that problem, so only those histories are relevant which feed extant interests intrinsically and instrumentally. No one would want a complete account of all that happened in the past, were such an account possible as it manifestly is not. Rather, we want selection which discriminates between the trivial and the important, the inconsequential and the consequential, the irrelevant and the pertinent. Always a historian and not history makes the selection,

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though selections are guided by leads arising within and from materials studied.

The plurality of purposes and the relativity of judging fulfillments are not inimical to impartiality. Much confusion in argument has resulted from failure to distinguish two meanings of impartiality. With respect to truth and truth-tests, a scholar is impartial who follows evidence where it leads, to assert nothing other in his conclusions than he thinks the evidence scrupulously searched out and examined will bear. To serve this ideal of impartiality well, he must guard against special pleading for cherished religious, moral, and political beliefs where such pleading rigs the account or takes precedence over conforming assertion to evidence. With respect to assessing worth of human thought and action, however, impartiality cannot consist in a neutrality that stands nowhere and for nothing upon questions of right and wrong, beautiful and ugly, success and failure. Impartiality consists rather in scrupulous care to keep distinct the judging from without and from within by marking off present-day valuing and value-criteria from past preferences and standards. Valuational impartiality is maintained in honoring perspectives other than our own and in rendering what is due to others in accord with their perspectives no matter what we may now prefer for ourselves. Valuational impartiality is prejudiced or lost when value constructions later instituted are read back as though incumbent upon predecessors.

When Shotwell elaborates the shortcomings of Thucydides from the standpoint of modern historians, he is not partial to the modern at the expense of the ancients so long as he keeps clear that the present-day judgment of failure carries no retroactive obligation. Thucydides cannot have failed in his own time by requirements for historiography credited in their formulation to Ranke and Bernheim. Nor is a historian partial to predecessors in assessing their success or failure in their own terms unless, in addition, he assumes that their meanings have absolute claim to acceptance. A historian fails within his own day in falling short of meeting its expectations and requirements. He succeeds or fails later in the career of his artifact in what it becomes for subsequent events of reading and appraisal, and by expectations and requirements brought to it by later-day readers.

After praising Thucydides as the "most modern" of ancient historians, Shotwell proceeds to argue at length that he was nonetheless "antique" in choice of subject and in outlook upon it. Thucydides failed to be "modern" in appreciation of the scientific outlook not

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"from any personal limitations, but because he lived before a scientific study of society was possible." Although clear that Thucydides could not be prescient of our "modern," Shotwell proceeds to judge him as though he should have forsaken a poetic and dramatic ideal of a great story and have cleaved only to "the imperative demand of the scientific spirit." Here Shotwell's retrospective valuing from without has run to partiality favoring his own outlook. He reads off the limited currency of the modern ideal—the ideal of history as a science—as though it should have the same purchase in the Age of Pericles. He is not unaware that he has indulged such partiality, for he adds "we must not be too sure of our judgment of the . . . antique," and affirms that Thucydides "must be judged in his own environment. Certainly no one in ancient Greece or Rome could have guessed that a historian would ever object to the writing of orations as a legitimate part of historical narrative."

How is it, though, that Shotwell does not maintain the valuational impartiality of adhering consistently in his own appraisal to the distinction between judging from within and judging from without? What posture of his partiality obscured the anachronism of reading present valuations of the past into the past contrary to professed intent to avoid such retrospective fallacy? The answer is found in his partiality for scientific history run back as the "central thread"—a thread having Shotwell on the near end and Thucydides at the far end. Since the near end, the modern, is the fulfillment of progress along the thread, the far end dwindles to anticipations and partial glimmerings. Valuation from this Hegelian-like interpretation locates Thucydides midway between primitive and modern: "In him the antique spirit is revealed at its best; but it was antique."

Historians enjoin impartiality in the search for the truth because the truth-telling they esteem has been found best served by an open, fair-minded inquiry. Desiring to protect the search for truth against deviations and adulterations, they properly warn against the dangers of moral bias, political advocacy, religious persuasion, and metaphysical conviction. Yet it is not requisite for truth-seeking and truth-telling in history to enjoin ascetic abstention from indulgence in moral and æsthetic judgments. Such abstention, set forth as an ideal for scientific history, might indeed be thought desirable if fidelity to facts were only to be had at the price of eschewing interpretation. There is, however, no native antipathy between truth-telling and moral appraising. There

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is only the very human but ever corrigible tendency to claim too much in one or another devotion.

Cognizant of the risk of bent, the devotees of scientific history have looked in two directions for the avoidance, or at least the reduction of the risk. The first is the way of renunciation and divestment. The only impartiality admitted is that of positivistic inquiry pursued in a scientific spirit freed from all entangling alliances with values other than truth-value. The second is the way of transcendence. Here escape from particular perspectives and special claims rides upon Hegelian thesis of absolute value-verdicts forthcoming from history itself, or upon Platonic thesis of value-verdicts evinced to a time-free intuition of a timeless unity.

Insistence upon the way of abnegation has usefulness in directing attention to the meaning which impartiality has in the search for truth, but when pursued to the neglect or the denial of historians' responsibility for normative valuations becomes itself a form of partiality. The difficulties of abstaining from sided valuations, were this desirable, are great if not insuperable. Practice of historians affords ample evidence that even those who sought most to stand outside perspective valuing were not successful. It does not follow that the ideal of valuation neutrality, no matter how unattainable in practice, should still be affirmed in recommendation that historians write as though they were situated in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean in complete social isolation. The alternatives in value judging do not reduce to the kinds of transcendence offered by Hegel and Plato, nor to an irrational subjectivism with which historical relativism is often confused by its critics. There is the alternative which historians themselves insist upon—the alternative residing in the scrupulous differentiation between judging from without and from within. In this lies the impartiality attainable in perspectival valuing.

A divine recorder caring equally for all careers would care especially for none, and in this equalitarian indifference have reason to record everything or nothing. For the human historian in this world, selection is not only inescapable but desirable. His judging of his own task and of the tasks of other historians is an historically conditioned affair—an affair tied inescapably to perspective. Perspectives in their manyness and value judgments in their relativities are limited, special, and situational. As such, they support no fixed and final assessments of meaning and worth. How history ought to be written has no timeless answer because there is no timeless idea and ideal of history. Worths of writ-

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ten histories are themselves historically assigned according with the ways in which they answer in times past, present, and future to their interests and measures, expectations and requirements. Historicity of judging calls neither for attack nor defense but rather for comprehension in theory which accords with evidence and for ideals of task and fulfillment which can be honored in practice.

*University of California, Berkeley*

# Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association 1952-1953

## TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF OFFICERS

**BOARD OF OFFICERS:** Glenn R. Morrow, *Chairman*; Milton C. Nahm, *Secretary-Treasurer*; William H. Hay, Bertram E. Jessup, Melvin Rader, Philip B. Rice, James Ward Smith.

### COMMITTEES:

*International Cultural Co-operation:* Cornelius Krusé, *Chairman*; George Boas, W. R. Dennes, W. E. Hocking, Susanne K. Langer, Richard McKeon, Charles Morris, Arthur E. Murphy, F. S. C. Northrop.

*Carus Lectures:* D. W. Gotschalk, *Chairman*; George Boas, C. J. Ducasse, Morris T. Keeton, Charles Morris, Everett Nelson.

*Publication:* Marten ten Hoor, *Chairman* (1955); Alburey Castell (1953), Virgil Aldrich (1954), Emerson Buchanan (1954), Charles A. Baylis (1955).

*Information Service and Placement:* Lewis E. Hahn, *Chairman*; Elmo A. Robinson, H. J. B. Ziegler.

### DELEGATES:

*Delegate to the American Council of Learned Societies:* Cornelius Krusé (1957).

*Delegate to the American Association for the Advancement of Science:* C. West Churchman.

*Delegate to the American Documentation Institute:* R. P. Hawes.

### *Report of the Secretary of the Board of Officers*

George R. Geiger resigned as Secretary Treasurer of the American Philosophical Association, December, 1951, after having served since 1947. The Board of Officers voted unanimously to express their appreciation of Professor Geiger, "who has devoted so much of his time and attention to the position of Secretary-Treasurer and has done it so well."

## CONSTITUTION OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

[The new Constitution of the Association, ratified by the Divisions, becomes effective January 1, 1954.]

### ARTICLE I—NAME

The name of this organization shall be the American Philosophical Association.

### ARTICLE II—MEMBERSHIP

1. The membership shall be membership in one or more divisions of the Association.
2. The present divisions are three: Eastern, Western, and Pacific. New divisions may be formed on application to the Board of Officers, with the approval of the Board of Officers and of the Executive Committee of all of the existing divisions.
3. Each division shall elect its own members and officers and shall fix its own dues.

## PROCEEDINGS

### ARTICLE III—OFFICERS

1. The governing body of the Association shall be a Board of Officers, composed as follows:

The President of each Division, during his divisional term of office.

The Secretary of each Division, during his divisional term of office.

The Chairmen of three standing committees of the Association.

One member from each Division elected for a three-year term (terms staggered).

A Secretary-Treasurer elected for a three-year term by the Board of Officers.

The Chairman of the Board shall be elected by the Board from its membership for a *three-year period*. His term of office as Chairman shall not be affected by the expiration of his membership (otherwise) on the Board.

2. The Board of Officers shall determine the percentage of the dues of each division which is to be collected annually from the divisional treasurers by the national secretary-treasurer to defray the expenses of the Board of Officers and Standing Committees, and shall apportion, collect and disburse the *pro rata* share of the expenses of special joint projects by the divisions.

### ARTICLE IV—STANDING COMMITTEES

1. International Cultural Co-operation.

2. Publication.

3. Information Service and Placement.

4. Any other committees which may be necessary for special projects. (Their chairmen do not belong *ex officio* to Board of Officers.)

5. The chairmen of these committees to be elected for five-year terms by Board of Officers.

### ARTICLE V—PUBLICATIONS

The Association shall publish annually the proceedings and presidential addresses of the divisions together with the combined list of members and a report of the Board of Officers. This publication shall be in charge of the Secretary who shall furnish a copy to each member. The expense of publication shall be borne *pro rata* by the several divisions.

### ARTICLE VI—AMENDMENTS

Amendments to this constitution may be made by a concurrent majority vote of the members of each division present at its regular annual meeting.

#### *Board of Officers:*

The Board of Officers, under the new Constitution, will take office January 1, 1954: Glenn R. Morrow, *Chairman*; George Boas (1954), William Frankena (1955), Lewis E. Hahn, William H. Hay, Bertram E. Jessup, Cornelius Krusé, Harold A. Larrabee, Stephen C. Pepper (1956), Melvin Rader, Philip B. Rice, James Ward Smith, Milton C. Nahm, *Secretary-Treasurer*.

#### *The Carus Lectures:*

The Carus Lectures for 1953 will be given by J. Loewenberg at the meeting of the Eastern Division, at the University of Rochester. The subject of the Lectures will be *Reason and Reality*.

The following memorial to Paul Carus was presented by C. I. Lewis at the meeting of the Eastern Division (1952):

## AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

PAUL CARUS — 1852-1919

Paul Carus is one of that considerable number of gifted men of Germanic origin who have been attracted to America by our wider and readier independence of thought and who have made some signal contribution to the interests of liberal thinking in this country. In his case that contribution consisted in the numerous articles, monographs, translations, prefatory expositions, and small books, on a wide variety of topics in philosophy and comparative religion, which came from his pen—there is no complete bibliography but the number of these must run well over a hundred—but even more in his editorial supervision of the magazines and books brought out by the Open Court Publishing Company, from 1887 to 1919. I suppose that most of us here will still have in our libraries our first texts of the philosophical classics, and amongst them those brought within our student means by the reprint policy of that organization.

Paul Carus was himself once a young man with not too much money, his mind filled with the problems and the wonder of philosophy, and torn by the conflict between an orthodoxy too narrow for him and the dictates of his liberal temper and his philosophical insights. He was born, just a century ago, at Ilsenberg, the son of a Lutheran pastor who in later years rose to high office in the Church. Paul's education was at the gymnasia of Posen and Stettin, the universities of Greifswald, Strassburg, and Tübingen. After receiving the doctorate of philosophy from Tübingen in 1876, he passed the state examinations and was appointed to teach at the military academy in Dresden. But as was nearly inevitable in a man of his forthright integrity and unorthodox convictions, he soon found himself at odds with bureaucratic supervision. He resigned his post and emigrated, first to England for a short period and then to America. The record of these years is meager, but sometime within them he wrote the essays, *Aus dem Exil* (Dresden, 1885), and the long poem with the Lucretian title *De Rerum Natura*. It is also of interest that in England he encountered Philip E. B. Jourdain, and the two became lifelong friends.

It is also in these and other writings of the earlier period, rather than those of later years, so often determined by particular occasions or the multiplicity of his expanding duties and interests, that one can most easily identify the *motif* of his philosophic thinking. It is well to remember that these formative years of his life fell within the general period when a main influence in German thought was the reaction against orthodoxy and idealism which gave rise to the so-called higher criticism and to various radicalisms, including left-wing Hegelianism and classic expressions of modern materialism. In Great Britain and America, it was the time when orthodoxy felt itself challenged by Darwinism, and men of intellectual awareness debated the issues set by Herbert Spencer's *Synthetic Philosophy*.

Paul Carus had experienced this same ferment in his own intellectual development. And his monism is that point of view with which he emerged from it. In this view, the basic element derives from Kant. But Carus could not accept the Kantian conception of ultimate reality as unknowable. Instead, he conceived that it is the formal constituent which is the ultimate and ruling factor in reality. In this, he built upon the 'theory of forms'; an inspiration derived from his teacher Hermann Grassmann, whom we know as one of the German contributors to the present reformulation of mathematics. I think that this theory of Carus may vaguely remind us of older conceptions also; of the Greek and Stoic conception of the Logos, if not of Plato and Aristotle. As Carus puts it, it is of the essence of mathematics that it deals with *anyness*. And there is a series of forms, all the way from the most abstract and mathematical to the most concrete of structures with which science can deal, and all that is embodied in the multiplicity and variety of phenomena which can reveal themselves to the mind of man. Form is the real essence of all reality. And the formal laws of reality are identical with the formal laws of thought. Memory is simply the psychological aspect of the preservation of form in living substance. For this formal ground-element, Carus does not hesitate to use the word

## PROCEEDINGS

"soul"; and finally he says: "Taking this view of the importance of form and using the word soul to signify the formal factors of the various forms and their relations that have evolved and constantly are evolving; we are naturally led to the conception of the soul of the universe. The soul of the universe we call God."

But withal it did not comport with the temper of Carus to indulge in what he labelled *Systemmacherei*, and in later years he was accustomed to disclaim any philosophy of his own. Holding to this conviction of a cosmic unity, underlying and sustaining all else, he was content to remain somewhat the amateur, maintaining always perspective; ready to seek and to serve the truth wherever he should catch the gleam of it, and to worship God in all temples.

In 1887, Eduard C. Hegeler, having already instituted the Open Court Publishing Company in the interest of scientific and religious liberalism, found in this man a kindred spirit, and called him to undertake what was to become his life-work; the editorship of *The Monist*, "devoted to the Philosophy of Science," and of *The Open Court*, "devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and the Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea," and administration of the widespread activities of the Open Court Company in offering a forum for liberal thought in science and philosophy and religion and in making the products of such thinking available to a wider public. It is characteristic of Carus that, from the earliest expression of his aspirations to the maturest formulation of his conceptions, he would admit no diremption of theoretical philosophy from practical life. After his death in 1919, it was Jourdain who wrote of him:

"It seems that, in those who really live in their works and ideals, it is impossible to separate the philosopher from the man. Everything human that struck one about Paul Carus—his humorous and lovable personality, the affection with which he inspired all of us—seemed to be knit up with the ideals he followed. These ideals were indeed his very life. . . ."

Such was the spirit of the man of whom we remind ourselves today. The Carus Lectureship, in which this Association participates, stands as memorial to his life and his work.

Harvard University

C. I. LEWIS

### Representatives:

The American Philosophical Association has been represented on the following occasions: the American Council of Learned Societies (Rye, N.Y.), January 21-23, by Cornelius Krusé and Milton C. Nahm; the Inauguration of Hurst R. Anderson as President of the American University (Washington, D.C.), February 24, by Victor Lowe; the Sixteenth National Congress of Philosophy (Bologna), March 19-22, by Patrick Romanell; the 57th Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Political Science, (Philadelphia, Pa.), April 10-11, by Paul Schrecker and Milton C. Nahm; the Berkeley Bicentenary Celebration (Dublin), July 10-12, by Herbert W. Schneider and Richard M. Martin; the Eleventh International Congress of Philosophy (Brussels), August 20-26, by Glenn R. Morrow.

### Divisional Meetings:

The places and dates of the meetings of the Divisions of the American Philosophical Association are as follows: Eastern Division, University of Rochester, Rochester, N.Y., December 28-30; Pacific Division, Stanford University, Palo Alto, California, December 28-30; Western Division, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois, May 6-8, 1954.

MILTON C. NAHM, *Secretary-Treasurer*

## AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

### AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES

The annual meeting of the American Council of Learned Societies was held in the Westchester Country Club, Rye, N.Y., on January 21-23, 1953.

The American Philosophical Association was represented at the meeting of the Conference of Secretaries by Milton C. Nahm, and at the meeting of the Council by Cornelius Krusé, delegate of the Association and Chairman of the Council.

The treasurer, Sidney Painter, in making his annual report referred appreciatively to the efficiency of the executive staff which was reflected in the fact that the administration of the Council represented only ten per cent of the funds received and disbursed. He pointed out that administration, and "planning and development," the continuing core of the Council's work, call for an annual budget of about \$110,000.00. The Council has no endowment and, therefore, depends almost entirely on grants from foundations and gifts from individuals. There was much discussion throughout the sessions of the Council as to how to broaden the base of financial support for the Council. An adequate endowment to provide an assured income to cover the core needs of the budget would help greatly in giving the Council a sense of security and stability. Funds for specific projects, even of considerable magnitude, are far easier to obtain than funds for the everyday continuing central needs.

No doubt the most important event to record since the previous annual meeting is the resignation, as of September 1, 1952, of Charles Odegaard as executive director, in order to assume the deanship of the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts of the University of Michigan. His departure means a great loss to the Council. In the four years of his incumbency of the directorship, through his imagination, energy, and vision of the role which a "national strategy board for the humanities" might play in this country and abroad, he signally advanced every concern and interest of the Council, infused new life into older continuing enterprises, and initiated and developed new activities of great significance, like the Corning Conference, the Council's investigation of and the consultative services offered in the field of scholarly publication and personnel studies in the field of the humanities.

An able and active committee of the Board of Directors, under the chairmanship of Theodore C. Blegen, is currently seeking a new executive director.

Meanwhile and during the interim period, pending the appointment of the new director, the Administrative Secretary, Mortimer Graves, was requested and authorized by the Board to assume the functions of the Executive Director. The Board of the Council voted to express great appreciation of Mr. Graves' success in maintaining, with the devoted cooperation of his colleagues in the staff, the operations of the Council on a high level of effectiveness.

The outstanding feature of the annual meeting this year was the fact that after the necessary business of the Council was concluded with dispatch, the Council during two days resolved itself into a committee of the whole for group discussions of the nature and functions of the humanities and how through the Council they can be made to contribute more effectively in present-day society. Since the Board of Directors have steadily attempted to bring the Council and

## PROCEEDINGS

its constituent societies into closer working cooperation through the secretaries of these societies, the conference of secretaries was invited to participate fully in these discussion groups. All participants agreed that this was one of the most important annual meetings of the Council in terms of a thorough consideration of fundamental policy for the Council and of looking for ways and means of making the potential contribution of the humanities more effective in the United States and in the world today. There was much soul-searching as to why, for example, in the United States the humanities do not receive the general recognition accorded them in England or on the Continent, and why they are not here confronted with similar high expectations in meeting modern problems as there. There was frequent acknowledgment of the humanist's failure to communicate the results of his scholarly activities understandably and persuasively to the general public. (There was no neglect of the scholar's difficulty in communicating his results to his fellow scholars because of acute publication problems.) Readiness to undertake self-criticism did not, however, diminish the high hopes entertained by Council members and secretaries for the humanities in general, and for the Council in particular, as the chief national spokesman for and representative of the humanities in this country.

Many promising suggestions were made, aimed first at making the individual members of the constituent societies more aware of the Council and its role in furthering their common aims, and secondly at discovering Council operations through which the humanities may make a greater contribution to our society. The areas of Council action specially considered were those of personnel, implementation, research, and communication. The *ACLS Newsletter* will in the near future give a fuller report than is here possible on the detailed substance of these important and encouraging discussions.

The following nominees for officers of the Council were elected for the year 1952

*Chairman*—Cornelis W. de Kiewiet

*Vice-Chairman*—Roger McCutcheon

*Secretary*—William R. Parker

*Treasurer*—Sidney Painter

CORNELIUS KRUSÉ

## COMMITTEES

### *Publication Committee*

Professor Gregory D. Walcott, General Editor of Source Books in the History of Science, has submitted the following report:

The *Source Book in Chemistry* by Leicester and Klickstein came from the press late in May, 1952. By October 31 the sales had amounted to 907 copies, which the publishers regard as "a very good start." The *Source Book in Animal Biology* by Hall has continued to sell well; a total of 1,353 copies have been disposed of since its appearance in February, 1951. The manuscript for a *Source Book in Mediaeval Science* is developing slowly, and a competent editor for the *Source Book in Botany*, so long delayed, is in sight. The several men who agreed to produce a manuscript for a *Source Book in Twentieth Century Science, 1900-1950* have begun work.

### AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

During the year a change in contractual arrangements became necessary to keep the *Source Book in Astronomy* on the market. A subsidy of about \$1,200 was paid to the publishers from the Carnegie Fund, and the royalties on that volume were increased. It is estimated that the new edition of 500 copies will last ten or a dozen years, when the subsidy will be liquidated. Other volumes of the series, as the sales naturally drop, may be supported in the same way. Such works should never go off the market. On page 3 of *Science* for March 21, 1952, the General Editor presented a rather complete survey of the series as a whole.

It should be pointed out that the change in contractual arrangements with the publishers, mentioned by Professor Walcott, is regarded by the Committee as in the nature of an experiment, the results of which should be reviewed when a sufficient number of years for its testing have elapsed.

During the year, work was begun on the publication of the second book to be aided by a grant (\$400) from the Special Publication Fund, Professor Philip Merlan's *From the Academy to Neo-Platonism*. The terms of the grant were substantially the same as those to Professor Oliver's *Theory of Order* published in 1951, the first repayments from which were received this year. The fact that the only practicable publishing arrangement for Professor Merlan's book was offered by a Dutch publisher is some indication of the critical state of affairs in scholarly publication in this country at present.

Thanks to the initiative of Secretary-Treasurer Geiger, the Board of Officers of the Association approved a transfer of \$500 from the general treasury to the Special Publication Fund, and it is hoped that it may be possible to make additional similar transfers in the not-too-distant future. The Special Publication Fund also received an additional contribution of \$200 from the Western Division, bringing its present balance to the sum of \$820.28.

The Publication Committee has been assured by the Program Committee of the Eastern Division that the underwriting by a foundation of possible losses incurred in issuing the papers of symposia at the division's annual meetings was designated as a "non-publishing venture" aimed only at the improvement of the division's programs.

Since the merging of the functions of the Bibliography Committee with this committee at the beginning of this year, Mr. Emerson Buchanan, who is now a member of this committee, has continued to supply information on American books to the International Bibliography of Philosophy in Paris, and also to make the arrangements with publishers for the annual exhibition of recent publications in philosophy at the annual meeting of the Eastern Division.

With the ending of his term this December, the chairman will have completed nearly two full terms totalling over five years. In view of the lengthening of the term of the chairman under the revised constitution to five years, and other pressing circumstances, he begs leave to retire, with sincere thanks to the other members of the Committee, past and present, to the members of the Board of Officers, and to all the members of the Association who have been so generous with their time and talents in assisting the Committee in its work.

For the Committee,

HAROLD A. LARRABEE, *Chairman*

## PROCEEDINGS

### *Committee on Information Service*

In terms of number of appointments effected through Committee nominations, the Committee can report the best results it has achieved for some time, having placed 20 of its nominees. Almost twice as many positions were reported to us this year as last year, but many of them were one-year vacancies made possible by Ford or Fulbright awards to regular staff members. There was also, however, a great increase in the total number of registrants, and a discouragingly large number of them were unable to secure an academic position of any sort.

Registrants .....	287
Positions consulted about .....	39
Appointments resulting from Committee nominations .....	20

At the invitation of the Executive Committee of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, the Chairman of the Committee on Information Service set up a placement office at the annual meeting of the society, April 10-12, 1952, at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tennessee, and three of our placements were for positions of which we learned at this meeting. The Southern Society has invited the Committee to set up a placement office at its next meeting at the University of Texas, Austin, Texas.

At its September, 1951, meeting, the Pacific Division appointed Professor Elmo A. Robinson to the Committee, replacing Professor Paul Marhenke, whose wise counsel and generous cooperation made him for many years an invaluable member of the Committee. Professor Marhenke's retirement from the Committee came only a few months before his untimely death. The Eastern Division appointed Professor Howard J. B. Ziegler to succeed Professor Lewis W. Beck, whose able leadership has contributed so much to the development of the Committee.

### FINANCIAL STATEMENT

#### RECEIPTS

Balance from 1951 .....	\$ 96.43
Eastern Division .....	180.00
Western Division .....	90.00
	\$366.43

#### EXPENDITURES

Secretarial Assistance .....	\$ 70.00
Postage .....	114.50
Stationery, Printing, Supplies .....	84.24
	\$268.74
BALANCE .....	\$ 97.69

The expenses of the Committee in past years have been borne by the three divisions, the proportion charged to each division being roughly determined by its share of the total membership. On this basis the ratio has been Eastern 60 per cent, Western 30 per cent, and Pacific 10 per cent; and the Committee accordingly requested for 1952 from the Eastern Division \$180, from the Western Division \$90, and from the Pacific Division \$30. In view of rising costs of printing, mimeographing supplies, and the like, expenses for the Committee for 1953 are likely to be higher than for this year. Hence in spite of our present balance

#### AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

(which will probably be wiped out by bills coming due in January) the Committee will probably need at least as much as was requested for this year.

LEWIS E. HAHN, *Chairman*

#### *Committee on International Cooperation*

Leopoldo Zea, distinguished Mexican scholar in the history of philosophy, continued his research and publication in this field as a fellow of the Association under the Rockefeller grant awarded to the American Philosophical Association in order to foster better understanding of Latin American and North American philosophy. This grant terminated on December 31, 1952. The Association expressed its great appreciation of this grant, which made it possible, in addition to the above-mentioned project, for five philosophers from Brazil, Chile, the Argentine, and Mexico to come to this country as visiting professors for varying lengths of time. Their residence among us helped greatly in making North American philosophical tendencies better understood in Latin America and vice versa.

The Committee on International Cooperation lost one of its most active and interested members in the death of Edgar S. Brightman. Our Latin American colleagues have always held him in high esteem and greatly appreciated his friendship and his efforts in behalf of making their work better known in this country. His graduate course on Latin American philosophy was the first course of that character in this country.

The organizing committee of the Fourth Inter-American Congress of Philosophy notified the chairman of this Committee of the indefinite postponement of the Congress which was to have been held in Havana, Cuba, on the 20-31 January, 1953.

The XI International Congress of Philosophy will take place in Brussels on 20-26, August, 1953.

Patrick Romanell, who is teaching at the University of Turin under a Fulbright grant, has been appointed delegate of the Association to the Bologna National Congress of Philosophy to be held in March.

It is with great satisfaction that we record the appointment of Herbert W. Schneider to serve for two years as the head of the Division of Philosophy and the Humanities within the Department of Cultural Activities of UNESCO.

The Institut International de Philosophie with its central headquarters in Paris has announced that its members from the United States are E. S. Brightman, Irwin Edman, Cornelius Krusé, W. P. Montague, and Herbert Schneider. The total membership comprises seventy members from twenty countries.

CORNELIUS KRUSÉ

#### AUDIT REPORT

Yellow Springs, Ohio  
January 12, 1953

Professor George R. Geiger, *Secretary-Treasurer*  
American Philosophical Association  
Yellow Springs, Ohio  
Dear Sir:

I have made an examination of your records for the period ended December 15, 1952, and submit herewith my report consisting of this letter and the following exhibits:

# PROCEEDINGS

EXHIBIT A—Summary of Cash Receipts and Disbursements for the period ended December 15, 1952.

EXHIBIT B—Reconciliation of fund balances to securities and cash in bank as at December 15, 1952.

The amount of cash on hand at December 15, 1952 has been verified by correspondence with your depositories. Securities in the form of United States Treasury Bonds, Series G, were inspected at the Miami Deposit Bank, Yellow Springs, Ohio.

All receipts were compared with bank deposits and all disbursements were evidenced by cancelled checks or supporting vouchers.

In my opinion the attached statements fairly represent the results of activity for the period ended December 15, 1952.

Respectfully submitted,  
D. A. Magruder, *Public Accountant*  
*Professor of Accounting, Antioch College*  
*Yellow Springs, Ohio*

## EXHIBIT A

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION  
Summary of Cash Receipts and Disbursements  
for the Period Ended December 15, 1952

	General Treasury	Revolving Fund for Publication	Rockefeller Fund
<i>Fund Balances, May 1, 1952</i> .....	\$2,484.44	\$12,952.74	\$3,743.81
<i>Cash Receipts:</i>			
Dues and Pro-rata Cost of Proceedings:			
Eastern Division — 1952.....	980.28		
Western Division — 1952.....	543.06		
Sale of Proceedings .....	153.90		
Interest on U.S. Government Bonds and Savings Account .....		175.78	
Royalties from McGraw-Hill Book Company..		220.50	
Royalties from Antioch Press—			
Oliver book (special fund).....		45.28	
Special Publication Fund—Western Division..		200.00	
Special Publication Fund—Transfer from General Treasury .....		500.00	
<i>Total Cash Receipts</i> .....	<u>\$1,677.24</u>	<u>\$ 1,141.56</u>	<u>\$ . . . .</u>
<i>Total Cash Available</i> .....	<u>\$4,161.68</u>	<u>\$14,094.30</u>	<u>\$3,743.81</u>
<i>Cash Disbursements:</i>			
Printing Proceedings—Antioch Press.....	1,168.54		
Typing Membership lists .....	20.00		
Audit Expense— 1952.....	22.50		
Postage .....	18.00		
Bank Charges and Safety Deposit Box Rental..	4.80		
Stationery .....	33.86		
Carus Committee .....	2.78		
Transfer to Special Publication Fund.....	500.00		
McGraw-Hill Company .....		1,200.00	

# AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Phillip Merlan—book grant (special publication fund) .....	400.00		
To Jorge Portilla .....		200.00	
To Leopold Zea .....		1,200.00	
Miscellaneous expense .....		7.25	
<b>Total Disbursements</b> .....	<b>\$1,770.48</b>	<b>\$ 1,600.00</b>	<b>\$1,407.25</b>
<b>Fund Balances, December 15, 1952</b> .....	<b>\$2,391.20</b>	<b>\$12,494.30</b>	<b>*\$2,336.56</b>

\*This fund is to be returned to the Rockefeller Foundation during the year 1953.

## EXHIBIT B

Reconciliation of Fund Balances to  
Securities and Cash in Bank as at  
December 15, 1952

### Summary of Fund Balances:

General Treasury .....	\$ 2,391.20
Revolving Fund for Publication .....	12,494.30
Rockefeller Fund * .....	2,336.56

**Total All Funds** .....

**\$17,222.06**

### Summary of Securities and Cash in Banks:

United States Treasury Bonds, Series G (in Safe Deposit Vault at Miami Deposit Bank) .....	\$ 7,800.00
Miami Deposit Bank, Yellow Springs, Ohio:	
Checking account .....	1,075.90
Savings account .....	6,009.60
Middletown National Bank, Middletown, Connecticut—	
Checking account .....	2,336.56

**Total All Assets** .....

**\$17,222.06**

\*This fund is to be returned to the Rockefeller Foundation during the year 1953.

GEORGE R. GEIGER, *Secretary-Treasurer, retiring*

## EASTERN DIVISION

*President:* Glenn R. Morrow

*Vice-President:* Max Black

*Secretary-Treasurer:* James Ward Smith<sup>1</sup>

*Executive Committee:* The foregoing officers and F. S. C. Northrop *ex officio* for one year, Susanne K. Langer (1953), Morton G. White (1953), Marvin Farber (1954), Leroy E. Loemker (1954), Roderick M. Chisholm (1955), Milton C. Nahm (1955).

The forty-ninth meeting of the Eastern Division was held at The City College of New York, December 29, 30, 31, 1952. The following program was presented:

### Symposium

*The Concept of Universal Human Rights* (Chairman, Richard Brandt)

<sup>1</sup>Resigned, July, 1953. Lucius Garvin appointed to fill remainder of term.

## PROCEEDINGS

Papers by A. I. Melden and W. K. Frankena. Comments by Lucius Garvin and Felix Cohen.

### *Joint Symposium with the American Society for Aesthetics Symbolism in the Visual Arts*

Papers by Rudolph Arnhem and Arthur Szathmary. Comments by Meyer Schapiro.

#### *Symposium*

*What Is a Rule of Language?* (Chairman, Morton G. White)

Papers by N. L. Wilson and R. M. Martin. Comments by Alice Ambrose Lazerowitz and George Berry.

#### *Plenary Session*

*The History of Philosophy* (Chairman, H. T. Costello)

Bernard Peach: "The Indefinability and Simplicity of Rightness in Richard Price's *Review of Morals*." Comments by Henry Aiken.

James W. Miller: "The Development of the Philosophy of Socrates." Comments by Robert M. Scoon.

E. A. Burtt: "A Comparison of the Basic Presuppositions of Western Philosophy Today with Those of 1900." Comments by Ledger Wood.

#### *Symposium*

*Concept and Theory in Social Science* (Chairman, F. S. C. Northrop)

Papers by Ernest Nagel and Carl Hempel. Comments by Robert Merton and R. M. MacIver.

#### *Presidential Address*

*The Philosophy of Natural Science and Comparative Law* .....  
..... Filmer S. C. Northrop

#### *Symposium*

*Phenomenalism* (Chairman, Marvin Farber)

Papers by Roderick Firth and Max Black. Comments by Norman Malcolm and W. V. Quine.

#### *Symposium*

*The Concept of Expression in Art* (Chairman, E. A. Burtt)

Papers by Vincent A. Tomas and Douglas N. Morgan. Comments by Bertram Morris and Monroe C. Beardsley.

#### *Group Meetings*

##### *The Peirce Society*

The Concept of the Given in Peirce and Mead ..... Maurice Natanson

C. S. Peirce's Conception of Logic ..... David Savan

##### *The Personalist Discussion Group*

Personalism and the Mind-Body Problem ..... Joseph D'Alfonso

##### *The Association for Realistic Philosophy*

Preface to Ethical Realism ..... Robert C. Baldwin

##### *Discussion Group on Creative Ethics*

Ethics for Policy Decisions: Is It Ethics? ..... Wayne A. R. Leys

The annual Business Meeting was held at 5:00 p.m., December 29th, President Northrop presiding.

The minutes of the forty-eighth annual meeting were approved as printed.

The following Treasurer's Report was read and approved:

# AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

FINANCIAL STATEMENT: December 22, 1951 to December 19, 1952

## Receipts:

Balance on hand, December 22, 1951:	
Book value of government bonds.....	\$1,000.00
Commercial account .....	953.85
Membership dues .....	2,676.10
Interest on government bonds.....	25.00

\$4,654.95

## Expenditures:

National dues for 1952.....	389.00
Cost of 1951-52 <i>Proceedings</i> .....	591.28
Expenses of officers and committees.....	191.80
Printing, mimeographing, clerical assistance.....	82.78
International Foundation of Philosophy.....	75.00
Postage and stationery.....	223.15
Committee on Information Service.....	180.00
Expenses, forty-eighth meeting at Bryn Mawr.....	219.75
Bank charges .....	16.48
Henry M. Magid .....	25.00

\$1,994.24

*Balance on hand*..... \$2,660.71

JAMES WARD SMITH, *Treasurer*

The Auditing Committee certifies that the Treasurer's Report has been examined and found correct.

Norman Malcolm  
Robert Scoon

The following Memorial Minutes were read, and by rising vote were adopted and ordered printed in the *Proceedings*:

## JOHN DEWEY

John Dewey's death on June 1, 1952 at the age of 92 marked the close of a brilliant epoch in American thought. He was of the great company of men and women who reaffirmed for this country at a trying period of its history the fundamental ideals of liberal civilization, and who helped create for it a secular naturalistic philosophy supported by responsible arguments. His writings show the impact of cultural and personal influences that no longer affect us directly; and with his passing, a vital tie has been severed with honored figures in our intellectual heritage.

The import of Dewey's work in philosophy has been revolutionary, and doubtless will long remain so, despite the fact that the wisdom and the generous conception of human potentialities which are the rich burden of his thought have their roots in the remote past. He was keenly aware, as few philosophers of his generation were, of the wide range of serious problems, both theoretical and practical, that confront men living in an era of social transformation; and few of his writings, even those most philosophically technical in substance and execution, fail to reveal his deep concern with issues that, in the first instance, are not academically philosophical at all. He had no universal formula for resolving once for all the many problems urgently needing solution; and he disbelieved vigorously in the validity of any such formulas, whatever their origin or credentials. But he was profoundly convinced that no genuine problems are inher-

## PROCEEDINGS

ently insurmountable, and that no antecedent limits can be placed upon the power of human intelligence to direct the course of human events. In intent as well as in effect, Dewey's major philosophical writings are in considerable measure clarified expressions and illustrations of the nature of science as a responsible method of inquiry and as critical intelligence in operation—disruptive of dogma and the inertia of blind custom, conservator and creator of beliefs warranted by experimentally controlled reflection, and discoverer of fresh possibilities for more satisfying forms of civilized living.

Dewey's reconstruction of logic as a theory of inquiry interpreted the various dualisms of traditional modes of thought as the conversion of distinctions in function into differences in ontological being. He was a consummate master in construing intellectual issues and linguistic formulations in terms of the contexts that generate them and alone make them intelligible; he was in consequence able to exhibit the spurious character of many traditional philosophical problems, identify the substantial bases of the perplexities which produced them, and propose fertile reorientations in analysis for outflanking them. The effect of this functional, contextual approach upon professional philosophical discussion has been far-reaching, and is still in the process of being absorbed. In any event, current preoccupation with analysis of linguistic usage as the key for unlocking perennial philosophical puzzles is but an application, partial and unwitting though it often is, of Dewey's pioneering use of the principle of contextual analysis.

But the influence of Dewey's philosophical reconstructions extends far beyond the arena of professional philosophical debate. It has been felt notably in educational theory and practice, in psychology, in jurisprudence and political thought, and in interpretations of arts. If to so many throughout the world Dewey became a living symbol of liberal intelligence, it is because he was able to demonstrate—by brilliant example as well as by subtle dialectic—the illumination that is the fruit of free inquiry, when inquiry is conducted in accordance with a responsible method and when it is committed to no loyalty other than the loyalty to the truth.

John Dewey was born in Burlington, Vermont, on October 20, 1859. He attended the University of Vermont and received his doctoral degree in philosophy from Johns Hopkins in 1884. He taught at the Universities of Michigan, Minnesota and Chicago, and since 1904 until his retirement in 1930 at Columbia University; in addition, he lectured at various times and for different periods at other institutions too numerous for mention. But even a complete list of his academic associations would not begin to do justice to his many-sided interests and activities, and certainly no university can claim him exclusively. For indeed the whole world was the scene of his activities. His life is an independent confirmation of his contention, which he supported by arguments of a technical nature, that there is no genuine problem concerning the existence of an external world, though there are innumerable challenging problems in it.

Whoever has had the privilege of being a student or colleague of John Dewey needs no reminder that his conception of human freedom as the realization of individual capacities was not simply a belief held by him formally, but represented an unflinching habit of his life. Those whose familiarity with his thought and actions is less personal, will never cease to honor him as a great contributor to the emancipation of the human spirit and to the embodiment of an integrated vision of human excellence. In his death the American Philosophical Association has lost one of its most eminent members and former presidents, philosophy a seminal mind, and mankind a rare friend.

ERNEST NAGEL

## KATHARINE EVERETT GILBERT

This past year, the American Philosophical Association lost one of its most distinguished members. Katharine Everett Gilbert died on April 28, 1952, at the age of 65, after an illness of several months.

## AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Mrs. Gilbert was president of the Association in 1945, and she had previously served as vice-president. She also held the offices of president and vice-president of the American Society for Aesthetics. Her career and work are known to you; it was a particular tragedy that the onset of her fatal illness came on the eve of a year in Italy as a Fulbright Research Fellow—a year of writing which she anticipated with great enthusiasm after her retirement and relief from administrative work.

Mrs. Gilbert was born July 29, 1886, in Newport, Rhode Island. Her A.B. and M.A. degrees were received from Brown University, and the Ph.D. from the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell. In 1942, Brown University conferred on her the honorary degree of doctor of letters. In her early career, she was assistant to Professor Alexander Meiklejohn and to Professor James E. Creighton while the latter was editor of the *Philosophical Review*. In 1928-29, she was Kenan Research Fellow in philosophy at the University of North Carolina.

In 1930, Mrs. Gilbert joined the staff of Duke University, where her husband, Professor Allan H. Gilbert, is Professor of English. Her contributions to the University and to the community were immeasurable; her work achieved practical realization in 1938, when she became head of the newly formed Department of Aesthetics, Art, and Music, now one of the University's most active and highly regarded departments. To the building of this department she gave a vast amount of her time and energy during the past fourteen years.

Best known of Mrs. Gilbert's books is *The History of Aesthetics*, done in collaboration with Helmut Kuhn. A revised edition of this work was recently published by the University of Indiana Press. Her other books include *Maurice Blondel's Philosophy of Action*, *Studies in Recent Aesthetics*, and a beautiful little volume, *Aesthetic Studies*, which Duke Press rushed to completion that she might see it before she died. This latter volume includes a complete bibliography of Mrs. Gilbert's extensive writings.

The members of this Association knew Mrs. Gilbert as scholar and colleague. It is appropriate to add a note of student opinion, from an editorial which appeared in the *Duke Chronicle* after her death: "The true work of art is man, as he recreates himself, and the way and possibility of such creation are taught by teachers like Mrs. Gilbert who is the personification of the beauty she teaches. We are brought to say, like Plato and Socrates, that this is the wisest and justest and best person we know and our lives are forever different for the knowing."

GLENN NEGLEY

## GEORGE SANTAYANA

George Santayana was born in Avila, Spain, on December 16, 1862. At the age of ten he was brought to this country and received a characteristically American, indeed a characteristically New England upbringing. He attended the Boston Latin School and Harvard College, where, after two years of study abroad, he became an instructor in the Department of Philosophy at Harvard in 1889. He taught at that university in successive grades in the academic hierarchy until 1912 when he retired from the university and quit America. Until after World War I, he resided in England, chiefly at Oxford, though in a purely private capacity. In 1920, he delivered a series of lectures at Oxford which were published subsequently as *Character and Opinion in the United States*. Beginning in 1920 he lived mostly in Rome, with long stays in Paris and occasional visits to his native Spain. During World War II, illness caused him to remove from his own quarters to the hospital maintained by the Blue Nuns in Rome, and there he remained until his death on September 26, 1952.

George Santayana on various occasions and in print made it clear that he did not himself regard himself as an American philosopher. He looked upon himself as a cosmopolitan mind whose heritage was the whole European tradition, among philosophers, notably Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza. But it hardly needs to be pointed out

## PROCEEDINGS

that his education was American and that all his active academic life—(his intellectual and creative life remained active to the very end of his long career)—was spent in America. Despite all his philosophic differences with William James, he owed him, as he acknowledges himself in an essay on William James, a great philosophical debt, and though he frequently denies that he learned anything from American thought, he has both piety for and debt to Emerson.

Though Santayana deplored the habit of philosophers congregating in universities, he frequently expressed the opinion that philosophers should not be teachers, and certainly not of philosophy; he himself was for a score of years one of Harvard's famous and influential teaching stars. Both as a lecturer and as a tutor he became legendary, his lectures for their eloquence and clarity, his seminars for the seminal suggestions, the sharp salutary criticisms he made.

During his forty years residence in Europe, after his resignation from Harvard, Santayana continued in isolation, broken by many visits chiefly from American friends, to pour out a succession of books, all variations upon his central and fairly consistent themes. Early in this century while still a professor at Harvard, he published the five volumes of the *Life of Reason*. That survey, as he called it, of the phases of human progress stated the fundamental position from which, though his emphasis changed, he was not essentially to vary. Everything ideal, he said, has a natural basis, everything natural an ideal possibility. Man is, so he declared, a mortal creature, an animal in a material world. But that material world which generates man generates spirit, too, and the spirit of man has mortal glimpses of eternal essences, of changeless Being.

Beginning in 1923, Santayana published over a period of years, the series entitled comprehensively *Realms of Being*, traversed those domains of matter, spirit, essence, truth, categories of Being whose interrelations and distinctions Santayana traced in a many-volumed soliloquy at once lyrical and dialectic through the years of his almost monk-like solitude in Rome. Beside these two major works, *The Life of Reason* and the *Realms of Being*, Santayana was explicitly what he often was implicitly, a poet, as his early poems and his later *Selected Poems* testified. Some of his sonnets have become American classics, and of his poetry in general it may be said that it prefigured his whole philosophy. In 1938, he published a long novel upon which he had long years spent care and meditation: *The Last Puritan*, and only a little less than two years before his death he published the extended work on a philosophy of politics which he called *Dominations and Powers*. In criticism from his early studies of *Poetry and Religion* and his *Three Philosophical Poets* he displayed his gifts as a philosopher of literature, and his very first book *The Sense of Beauty* gave the tone and perhaps the aesthetic criteria which controlled all his work. In terms borrowed from his own writing, philosophy was for him the attempt of the active animal in moments of detachment to have a steady intuition of the essence of all Being. He was a naturalist with a homesickness for Platonism. He looked at existence which is flux, and discerned in it eternity.

IRWIN EDMAN

## WILBUR MARSHALL URBAN

We record, with a sense of great loss, the death on October 15, 1952 of our colleague, Wilbur Marshall Urban, former president (1925) of our Association.

He was born on March 27, 1873 in Mount Joy, Pennsylvania, and, twenty-two years later, received from Princeton University his B.A. and, in addition, a Chancellor Green Fellowship for study in Germany. He spent two years there, in Jena and then in Leipzig, where he received his Ph.D. in 1897. He started his teaching at his Alma Mater, as Reader in Philosophy. From 1898 to 1902 he was Professor of Philosophy and Psychology at Ursinus College; from 1902 to 1920, Professor of Philosophy at Trinity College, Hartford, which later (in 1937) honored him with the degree of Doctor of Humane Letters; from 1920 to 1930, Stone Professor of Philosophy at Dart-

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mouth College; and from 1930 until his retirement in 1941, Professor of Moral Philosophy at Yale, where he also served for a time as Director of Graduate Studies and Chairman of the Department.

During this long and varied career as a teacher he exemplified in many ways that Socratic spirit which he so often praised—a lively interest in all of man's diverse cultural pursuits, scientific and literary, social and religious; a devoted concern for the unfolding mind of youth; and, above all, the philosophical urge to probe ever deeper into the heart of things and to achieve an ever more adequate synoptic vision of the whole. Among his most interesting teaching ventures was a course on great literary figures which was widely elected both at Dartmouth and at Yale. His many students, undergraduate and graduate, remember him with affection and respect.

He was also, from early manhood until his death, a tireless and productive scholar—an omnivorous reader, a constant writer, and a creative and speculative thinker. His earlier thinking was greatly influenced by Rickert, Hartmann and Eucken, and by the psychology of Ehrenfels and Meinong, and his first book, on *Valuation—Its Nature and Laws* (1909) reflected what was to remain a life-long preoccupation with values and evaluation. This interest was, from the outset, metaphysically oriented, as is evident in his second major work, *The Intelligible World—Metaphysics and Value* (1929). These axiological and metaphysical studies led him, in turn, to the intensive study of language—a study which resulted in his monumental *Language and Reality* (1939) in which he explored with impressive insight the nature of language, its multiple types and uses, and its crucial role in man's search for valid knowledge of objective fact and value. Increasingly, meanwhile, his active religious faith impelled him to interpret both reality and value in ultimately religious terms, as is evidenced in the two very significant books written after his retirement—*Beyond Realism and Idealism and Humanity and Deity*—in which he sought to transcend some of the great cultural cleavages of our time and to achieve a higher embracing synthesis.

Wilbur Urban was one of the most ardent proponents of the "Great Tradition" in Western philosophy—the *philosophia perennis*. In his own way, always incisive and stimulating, he exemplified his basic conviction that religious faith needs the discipline of philosophy and that philosophy without a religious orientation lacks depth and ultimate seriousness. This thesis he expounded, in the face of widespread opposition and indifference, with unflinching courage and forthrightness. For his humanity, his scholarship and his high seriousness we record our sincere respect and gratitude.

THEODORE M. GREENE  
CHARLES W. HENDEL  
JOHN E. SMITH

Professor N. A. Nikam presented the good wishes of the Indian Philosophical Congress, and read a message of greeting from the president of the Congress, Professor A. R. Wadia. It was voted unanimously that the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association send by cable a reciprocating message of greeting to the Indian Philosophical Congress, then in session at Mysore University, Mysore, India.

Professor Cornelius Krusé reported on the year's work of the American Council of Learned Societies.

The report of the Committee on Information Service was presented.

The Annual Report of the Publication Committee of the American Philosophical Association was read by Professors Gregory D. Walcott and Harold A. Larrabee.

The Nominating Committee (Charles A. Baylis, W. T. Stace and Herbert W. Schneider) presented the following nominations: For President, Glenn R.

## PROCEEDINGS

Morrow; for Vice-President, Max Black; for members of the Executive Committee, Roderick M. Chisholm and Milton C. Nahm. There being no further nominations, the foregoing slate was unanimously elected.

The following recommendations of the Executive Committee were adopted:

That the following nominees be elected to full membership in the Eastern Division: Luther John Binkley, Scott E. Cromm, Gerritt Daams, Lloyd Fulton Dean, Whitaker Thompson Deininger, Paul S. Hsiang, Arthur Kannwischer, James Clement Kearney, John G. Kemeny, Paul W. Kurtz, Irwin Chester Lieb, Hiram J. McLendon, Philip Nochlin, John J. O'Connor, Jason Lewis Saunders, Israel Scheffler, A. P. N. F. Stiernotte, Mrs. Ria Strairdes, Jacob Taubes, (Charles) Herndon Wagers, Robert Clifton Whittemore, N. L. Wilson, John William Yolton.

That the following be elected to associate membership: Thomas Downing Bowler, Donald Clark Hodges, Cornelius R. Johns, Nathan S. Kline, Elmer N. Lear, Robert Kinsey McConnell, Jr., Margaret Elaine Reesor, William L. Rossner, Anne Martin Schrecker, Kalixt S. Synakowski, James Leonard Wieland, Roy Wiig, John Wilkinson.

That the following be transferred from associate to full membership: Richard C. Gilman, T. Foster Lindley, Louis O. Mink, J. Wesley Robb, Richard Taylor.

Professor Richard B. Brandt reported to the Division on the arrangements for the publication of a volume containing symposium papers of the December meetings.

The following actions of the Executive Committee were announced:

That the President of the Division is empowered to appoint a Program Committee of three persons in addition to the Secretary-Treasurer, at least two of whom shall be members of the Executive Committee, such appointments to be made after consultation with the Secretary-Treasurer and the outgoing Chairman of the Program Committee. The President is further authorized to designate one member of the committee as chairman.

That for the year 1953 President Northrop appoints the following Program Committee: Morton White, Chairman; Richard B. Brandt; Marvin Farber; and the Secretary-Treasurer.

That pending adoption of the new constitution, the Eastern Division approves the incorporation of the Southwestern Conference into the American Philosophical Association, provided that such a step receives unanimous approval of the various Divisional Boards.

That Professor Paul Oskar Kristeller is appointed as the Division's representative on a Committee on Renaissance Studies.

The Secretary read a letter of thanks from Professor J. W. Scott of University College, Cathys Park, Cardiff, for the Eastern Division's contribution to the Aristotelian Society Index.

Professor Richard B. Brandt moved a vote of thanks to the City College of New York for the gracious hospitality accorded to the Eastern Division at its forty-ninth meeting. The motion was approved by rising vote.

A motion to adjourn was voted at 6:22 p.m.

**JAMES WARD SMITH, Secretary-Treasurer, retiring**

# AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

## PACIFIC DIVISION

*President:* Melvin Rader

*Vice-President:* Herbert L. Searles

*Secretary-Treasurer:* Bertram Jessup

*Executive Committee:* The foregoing officers and E. W. Strong *ex-officio* for one year, Hunter Mead (1953), John Goheen (1953), and Karl Aschenbrenner (1954).

The twenty-sixth annual meeting of the Pacific Division was held at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California, on December 29, 30, and 31, 1952. The following program was presented:

Monday afternoon, December 29

*The Great Assignment* ..... Susanne K. Langer

*Factual Descriptions and Normative Judgments* ..... Melvin Rader

Monday evening, December 29

*Symposium: "Obligation"* ..... George P. Adams and Joseph W. Cohen

Tuesday morning, December 30

*Section I: Semantic Analysis*

*Basic Propositions in Ayer and Russell* ..... Donald A. Wells

*Definitions, Reduction, and Physicalism* ..... Arthur Pap

*What Good Is Truth?* ..... Abraham Kaplan

*Section II: Theory of Knowledge*

*A Difficulty in the Substratum Theory* ..... William P. Alston

*Aspects* ..... Arthur Smullyan

*Three Dialogues Between Mutt and Jeff* ..... W. I. Matson

Tuesday afternoon, December 30

*Signs of Basic Agreement Between Cognitive and*

*Non-cognitive Theories of Value* ..... Cynthia A. Schuster

*Concerning Moral Responsibility* ..... Paul D. Wienpahl

*Moral Responsibility in the Emotive Theory of Value* ..... Wesley C. Salmon

Tuesday evening, December 30

Annual Banquet and Presidential Address

*On Judging History* ..... Edward W. Strong

Wednesday morning, December 31

*General History and History of Philosophy* ..... W. T. Jones

*John Dewey, "The Last Protestant"* ..... Robert E. Fitch

The Pacific Conference on the Teaching of Philosophy held its annual meeting on Monday morning, December 29. The following papers were presented and discussed:

*The Place of Philosophy in General Education* ..... Noel F. Mottershead

*Teaching of Philosophy in the Undergraduate Program* ..... John D. Goheen

The annual business meeting of the Division was held Wednesday, December 31, 9:00 a.m., with President Edward W. Strong presiding.

## TREASURER'S REPORT 1952

For period September 1, 1951 to December 31, 1951, as reported to the incumbent treasurer, Bertram Jessup, by the previous treasurer, Herbert L. Searles:

# PROCEEDINGS

## Balance on hand, September 1, 1951:

War bonds .....	\$ 296.00
Savings account .....	107.32
Commercial account .....	268.86

Total .. \$ 672.18

## Receipts, September 1 to December 31, 1951:

Membership dues .....	\$ 4.00
Interest on savings .....	.53

Total .. \$ 4.53

## Expenditures, September 1 to December 31, 1951:

Mimeographing abstracts 25th annual meeting .....	\$ 29.55
A.P.A. Publication fund .....	100.00
Executive Committee expense for mailing papers .....	2.80
Postage .....	2.20
Stencils for Philosopher's News Letter .....	7.30
Bank service charges .....	1.10

Total .. \$ 142.95

## For period January 1, 1952 to December 31, 1952:

### Assets, received from previous treasurer, January 1, 1952:

War bonds .....	\$ 296.00
Savings account .....	107.85
Checking account .....	129.91

Total .. \$ 533.76

Membership dues for 1952 received .. 244.00

Total receipts .. \$ 777.76

### Expenditures:

Postage stamps .....	\$ 19.00
Secretarial expense .....	10.00
H. L. Searles, reimbursement for postage .....	7.72
Kansas State College, printing Philosopher's News Letter .....	29.56
Univ. of Oregon Press, printing stationary .....	42.48
A.P.A. Annual dues .....	100.50
A.P.A. International Federation of Philosophy .....	13.80
Bank service charges .....	.49

Total .. \$ 223.55

Total receipts .. \$ 777.76

Total expenditures .. 223.55

Balance .. \$ 554.21

## Balance on hand, December 1, 1952:

War bonds .....	\$ 296.00
Savings account .....	107.85
Commercial account .....	150.36

Total .. \$ 554.21

Audited by F. Raymond Iredell

BERTRAM JESSUP, Treasurer

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Upon recommendation of the Executive Committee the following persons were elected to active membership: J. C. C. McKinsey, Charles H. Monson, Jr., Allan Edwin Shields, Frederick Simoni, Frederick Sontag, Alfred Stern, Avrum Stroll, Lawrence G. Thomas, Frank M. Vanderhoof. The following persons were elected to associate membership: Andrew L. Bowman, Stuart C. Hackett, Homer Knight, Paul A. Reeder, Jerry W. Stannard, W. Bruce Taylor, Leo B. Wyett.

The following officers nominated by the Executive Committee were elected for 1953: President, Melvin Rader; Vice-President, Herbert L. Searles; Executive Committee member, Karl Aschenbrenner for two years.

An invitation from Stanford University to hold the 1953 meeting at Palo Alto was accepted.

The President announced the appointment of Karl Aschenbrenner to replace Paul Marhenke, deceased, as a member of the Committee on Information Service.

It was moved, seconded and carried that the Pacific Division accept in the revised Constitution of the American Philosophical Association the versions of sentence 2, Article II, 2, previously approved by the Eastern and Western Divisions. The approved version reads: "New divisions may be formed on application to the Board of Officers, with the approval of the Board of Officers and of the Executive Committee of all of the existing divisions."

It was moved, seconded and carried that the Pacific Division continue on a pro rata basis its financial support for the coming year of the *Philosopher's News Letter*.

Elmo Robinson made a report on the *Philosopher's News Letter* and a report on the activities for the year of the Committee on Information Service.

A resolution presented by Melvin Rader that the Division express its appreciation to the School of Philosophy of the University of Southern California for its services and hospitality at the twenty-sixth annual meeting was unanimously adopted.

The President called attention to the deaths during the year of Donald Sage Mackay and Paul Marhenke and announced that persons would be appointed to write memorial notices to be printed in the *Proceedings*. The following memorials were subsequently submitted:

#### DONALD SAGE MACKAY

Donald Sage Mackay was born in St. Albans, Vermont, September 8, 1892. He graduated from Williams College in 1914, and spent the next three years as a student at Union Theological Seminary, receiving the degree of B.D. in 1917. His interest in the history of ideas and in the cultural roots of our civilization must then have become dominant, and he looked forward to an academic career of teaching and scholarship. But the first world war postponed further training for his chosen profession. He enlisted in the army upon graduation from the Seminary and became First Lieutenant in the 168th Infantry, 42nd Division, A.E.F., serving as First Battalion Scout Officer.

Upon his return to civilian life, he entered Columbia University where he received the Ph.D. degree in 1924. He was an Assistant in Philosophy at Columbia in 1919-20 and Lecturer, 1920-21. Before the final completion of his work for the degree, he came to California as an Associate in Philosophy at U.C.L.A. in 1921. He was appointed Instructor there in 1922, and Assistant Professor in 1924. He joined the Berkeley department in 1927, and was appointed Associate Professor in 1930. He became Professor in 1938, and served as Chairman of the Department from 1946 till the time of his death.

Professor Mackay's doctoral dissertation on *Mind in the Parmenides* was published in 1924, and he never ceased to have a profound interest in the philosophy of Plato.

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As Book Editor of the *Journal of Philosophy*, he reviewed a steady stream of writings on Plato and Greek philosophy, with unusual discernment and insight. His contributions over a long period of years to the annual volume of the Philosophical Union show a wide range of interests. To these essays he brought meticulous scholarship and profound understanding. He contributed a notable paper on *Emergent Evolution and Ethics* before the Seventh International Congress of Philosophy at Oxford in 1936. He was President of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1942, and his presidential address on *The Illusion of Memory* evinces an interest in the problem of time to which he gave increasing attention. His speculative turn of mind, combining a disciplined imagination with a firm grasp of inescapable fact, led him to explore the impact of the newer scientific ideas, both in the physical and biological sciences, upon the basic themes and issues of metaphysics.

Donald Mackay was the soul of friendliness, entering with understanding and sympathy into the attitudes and interests of others, colleagues and students alike. Students brought to him their problems, and he was utterly unselfish and unwearied in meeting the demands made upon his kindness and understanding.

He gave himself with unstinted devotion and generosity to the causes in which he believed. They were not always popular causes, but he held to his course with a sustained and courageous conviction, the fruit of his own independent and disinterested thinking. Philosophical study was not, for Donald Mackay, an intellectual game, remote from the exigencies of life. While he was fully able to enjoy the play of ideas, and to hold his own in the subtle pursuit of the argument wherever it might lead, he looked to philosophy to illumine and give guidance to the conduct of life and to the mapping of a steady course amidst the perplexing issues of our time.

The enduring tribute to the rare character of his life is the fragrant memory he has left in hearts of all who knew and loved him.

STEPHEN C. PEPPER

GEORGE P. ADAMS

## PAUL MARHENKE

Paul Marhenke was born in the city of Hannover, Germany, January 5, 1899. It often struck his friends as a happy coincidence that Leibniz's city should have been the birthplace of a scholar who shared so many of the great Seventeenth Century philosopher's interests. For Professor Marhenke was at home in several languages, had read widely in history and in politics and in several of the natural sciences, and was especially interested in mathematics and in those recent developments of logic and semantics which continue the tradition of Leibniz's work and in some ways reflect his hopes for the development of a "Universal Characteristic."

Marhenke had completed the course in the Bürgerschule and a half year in the Präparandenanstalt in Hannover when his parents brought him with them to California in 1913. After graduating at Pasadena Highschool, he entered enthusiastically upon studies in mathematics and classics, and later in philosophy, at the University of California where he took the bachelor's degree in 1919, the M.A. in 1922, and the Ph.D. in 1927. He was appointed Instructor in Philosophy in 1927, and continued as Assistant Professor from 1930 until 1938, as Associate Professor from 1938 to 1947, and as Professor of Philosophy from 1947 until his death on February 29, 1952, only a few months after he had been appointed Chairman of the Department.

While Marhenke's range of interests was considerable, his scholarly work and his teaching centered on theory of knowledge and logic. His studies and publications in the field of theory of perception reflected an equal mastery of systematic German work, the classical English discussions of Hume and his predecessors, and the critical work of recent English epistemologists—as well as acquaintance with relevant investigations in psychology and physiology. His scholarship was thus painstaking and thorough; yet every

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one of his articles made also some clear and useful advance beyond the critical interpretation of classical materials. Sometimes this advance took the form, not of developing solutions to puzzling problems, but rather of showing how the puzzles arose out of confusions of thought or statement and could be eliminated by specifying meanings more carefully.

Professor Marhenke was among the first American scholars not only to recognize the importance for logic of Russell and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica* (and some of its sources in the treatises of Frege and Peano), but also to study the method and structure of that work meticulously. He was able thus to give many generations of students a thorough introduction to recent logic, and to help them to appreciate the striking new developments made by logicians in recent years.

Professor Marhenke demanded of his students, as he demanded of himself, uncompromising precision of thought and statement. This was no pedantic demand. His colleagues and his pupils have recognized again and again that they have owed to his insistence on rigor an understanding of fundamental problems that they would not otherwise have reached.

Few men have been more devoted to their university and to their students than was Paul Marhenke. And his devotion was returned. As the years passed he came to realize how many people at work in the physical sciences, mathematics, engineering, law, psychology, as well as philosophy, admired him for the example of thoroughness he had not only set them, but he also helped them to follow. His dogged determination to accept nothing shoddy made his patience and humor and genuine friendliness the more impressive and the more influential.

In 1934 Professor Marhenke married Esther M. Robinson. She and their two sons, Karl and Paul, Jr., survive him. To many of his colleagues and students, discussion in the hospitable house he and his wife built high up in the Berkeley Hills, or on walks with him and his dogs, or on excursions in the Sierras (which he loved), will rank in intellectual interest with the more customary hours of intense work at his blackboard at the University.

WILLIAM R. DENNES, *Chairman*  
VICTOR F. LENZEN  
BENSON MATES

BERTRAM JESSUP, *Secretary-Treasurer*

## WESTERN DIVISION

### OFFICERS FOR THE YEAR 1952-53

*President:* Philip Blair Rice

*Vice-President:* Paul Henle

*Secretary-Treasurer:* William H. Hay

*Executive Committee:* The foregoing officers and Van Meter Ames (1953), Bertram Morris (1954), and Frederick L. Will (1955).

### NEWLY ELECTED OFFICERS FOR THE YEAR 1953-54

*President:* Paul Henle

*Vice-President:* Charner Perry

*Secretary-Treasurer:* Robert G. Turnbull

*Executive Committee:* The foregoing and Bertram Morris (1954), Frederick L. Will (1955), and Everett J. Nelson (1956).

The fifty-first annual meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association was held at Washington University and the Chase

PROCEEDINGS

Hotel, Saint Louis, Missouri, April 30, May 1 and 2, 1953.

The following program was presented:

Thursday, April 30, 1953

Concurrent Sessions at the Chase Hotel

Section A: Marten ten Hoor, University of Alabama, Chairman

*Symbols, Ideal Entities, and Classes*

Walter Cerf, Brooklyn College

Discussion by Roger Buck, University of Chicago

*What Are Abstract Entities?*

Hilary Putnam, Northwestern University

Discussion by Atwell R. Turquette, University of Illinois

*Contemporary Interpretations of the Problem of Universals*

Campbell Crockett, University of Cincinnati

Discussion by Leonard Pinsky, Ohio University

Section B: Bertram Morris, University of Colorado, Chairman

*Desire, Reason, and Choice*

W. Donald Oliver, University of Missouri

Discussion by Charles Wegener, University of Chicago

*Universal Rights*

Paul Ziff, University of Michigan

Discussion by Asher Moore, Northwestern University

*Moral Emotion and Emotivism*

Robert G. Turnbull, State University of Iowa

Discussion by W. E. Schlaretzki, Oklahoma A. and M. College

Section C: Van Meter Ames, University of Cincinnati, Chairman

*Observations Prefatory to a Philosophy of Religion*

Bruce T. Riley, Youngstown College

Discussion by Leo Ward, University of Notre Dame

*Ethics and Behavior*

Donald Clark Hodges, University of Missouri

Discussion by Wayne Leys, Roosevelt College

*Smoker*

Friday, May 1, 1953

Morning Concurrent Sessions at the Chase Hotel

Section A: A. C. Benjamin, University of Missouri, Chairman

*Is Quantity Prior to Quality?*

G. K. Plochmann, Southern Illinois University

Discussion by Thomas Storer, University of Nebraska

*Analytical Philosophy and Analytical Propositions*

Irving M. Copi, University of Michigan

Discussion by Michael Scriven, University of Minnesota

Section B: Frederick L. Will, University of Illinois, Chairman

*On a Synthetic A Priori Proposition*

Leo Simons, University of Missouri

Discussion by C. W. Marshall, University of Illinois

*The Principle of Verification*

Everett J. Nelson, Ohio State University

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Discussion by Julius R. Weinberg, University of Wisconsin

### *Section C: UNESCO and Cultural and Philosophical Relations Between East and West*

Richard E. McKeon, University of Chicago, Chairman; Robert W. Browning, Northwestern University; Max H. Fisch, University of Illinois; Merritt H. Moore, Knox College; P. T. Raju, University of Illinois.

Afternoon Concurrent Sessions at Washington University

### *Symposium: On the Philosophy of the Social Sciences*

Paul Henle, University of Michigan, *Chairman*; May Brodbeck, University of Minnesota; Alan Gewirth, University of Chicago; Richard Rudner, Naval Research Laboratory.

### HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

R. Tsanoff, Rice Institute, Chairman

### *Robert Grosseteste and Philosophic Method*

Vernon J. Bourke, St. Louis University

Discussion by Stuart MacClintock, Indiana University

### *The Principle of Four-Cornered Negation in Indian Philosophy*

P. T. Raju, University of Illinois

Discussion by Robert W. Browning, Northwestern University

### *The Epistemology of Indian Materialism*

Dale Riepe, University of South Dakota

Discussion by G. P. Conger, University of Minnesota

Tea, Women's Building Lounge, Washington University

Annual Dinner, McMillan Hall, Washington University

Paul Henle, Vice-President of the Western Division, Toastmaster  
Arthur Holly Compton, Chancellor of Washington University welcomed the members.

*Presidential Address: The Philosopher's Commitment*, Philip Blair Rice

*Saturday, May 2, 1953*

### *Reasons in Ethics*

Philip Blair Rice, Kenyon College, Chairman; Arthur E. Murphy, Cornell University; Henry Aiken, Harvard University; Bernard Diggs, University of Illinois.

### *Annual Business Meeting:*

The Annual Business Meeting was called to order at 11:00 a.m. by President Rice.

Since the minutes of the fiftieth meeting had been published in the *Proceedings*, it was moved, seconded, and voted that the Division dispense with the reading of them at the Business Meeting, and that they be approved as printed.

Upon the recommendation of the Executive Committee it was voted to elect the following to membership:

FULL MEMBERS: Roger Conant Buck, Paul R. Diesing, Leonard James Eslick, James Russell Gardner, Lawrence Haworth, John R. Kirk, William Hendricks Leue, Stuart MacClintock, Arthur W. Munk, John O. Nelson, Niels C. Nielsen, Jr., Leonard O. Pinsky, Hilary Putnam, Joel Pilant Sanders, Roderick Scott, Marcus G. Singer, Joe Zandstra, Sidney Zink.

ASSOCIATE MEMBERS: Harry W. Beardsley, Louis J. Cantoni, Vergil H.

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Dykstra, Victor Gourevitch, Donald Clark Hodges, Eugene F. Kaelin, William Robert McKenzie, Dale M. Riepe, Thomas B. Stauffer, D. B. Terrell, Lee Underhill, Forrest Williams.

ADVANCE TO FULL MEMBERSHIP: Manuel Bilsky, John L. McKenney, A. Nemetz, Wm. Sacksteder, Robert G. Turnbull.

The following Treasurer's Report was read:

## TREASURER'S REPORT

May 5, 1952 to April 30, 1953

### Receipts:

Balance on hand, May 5, 1952 .....	\$ 743.75
Dues collected to April 30, 1953 .....	1,475.00

Total \$ 2,218.75

### Expenditures:

International Dues, National Dues, and Proceedings .....	586.16
Committee on Information Service .....	90.00
Committee on Academic Freedom .....	60.00
Travel Expenses of Program Committee .....	22.69
Expenses of Newsletter .....	166.30
Postage .....	106.53
Stationery and Supplies .....	135.51
Revolving Fund of Publications Committee .....	200.00
Printing Program .....	215.00
Expenses remaining from 1952 meeting .....	32.02
Checks for Dues returned NSF .....	8.00
Bank Charges .....	3.86
Return of Overpayment of Dues .....	1.00

Total 1,627.07

Balance on Hand, April 30, 1953 \$ 591.68

WILLIAM H. HAY, Secretary-Treasurer

Lewis E. Hahn, reporting for the Auditing Committee, stated that the Treasurer's Report had been examined and found correct; it was moved, seconded, and voted that the Auditor's Report be adopted.

The Nominating Committee reported that in accordance with the By-Laws Paul Henle, Vice-President for 1952-1953 was the sole nominee for President. He was elected by acclamation and escorted to the platform. For Vice-President the Nominating Committee (R. Tsanoff, G. P. Conger, Frederick L. Will, W. H. Hay, and Eliseo Vivas) nominated A. C. Garnett and Charner Perry. There were no nominations from the floor and it was voted that the nominations be closed. A. C. Benjamin and William Frankena were appointed tellers to distribute and to count written ballots. Charner Perry received 64 votes; A. C. Garnett 33. Charner Perry was then declared elected. According to the By-Law adopted in 1948 he will succeed to the presidency in 1954. The Nominating Committee presented the nomination of Robert G. Turnbull for Secretary-Treasurer, Everett J. Nelson for a three-year term as member of the Executive Committee, William Frankena as representative of the Western Division on the National Board of Officers for a two-year term. There being no nominations from the floor, after it

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was moved, seconded, and voted that the nominations be closed, these candidates were declared elected.

Lewis E. Hahn reported on the work of the Committee on Information Service (Vacancies and Available Personnel) of the National Board of Officers. During the current year there has been notice received of 25 vacancies. Three of these were, however, in M. J. Adler's Institute. The work of the Committee consists of receiving notice of availability for new positions from philosophers, whether members of the Association or not, together with notice of positions open from institutions. A description of the post is sent to those applicants whose qualifications, as stated in their application, seem to fit. It is left to the individuals to write directly to the institution. Hahn stated that though they are received infrequently there are more notices of positions of top rank and pay than he has persons registered for. He closed by expressing his desire to be relieved of his responsibility. The Division voted thanks to Hahn and the other members of the Committee and authorized payment of its share towards the expenses of the Committee on Information Service during 1953.

Cecil H. Miller, Editor of the *Newsletter*, reported on the work of the *Newsletter* and asked that a successor be appointed. The Division voted thanks to the Editor for his valuable work and authorized the continuance of the *Newsletter* under an Editor selected by the Executive Committee.

Marten ten Hoor reported for the Publications Committee of the National Board of Officers. His motion of an official vote of thanks to H. A. Larrabee for his service as Chairman of the Publications Committee was carried. It was then voted that the Western Division contribute \$200 for the year 1953 to the Publications Committee.

On recommendation of the Executive Committee it was voted to accept the invitation of the University of Illinois to hold the next Annual Meeting at Urbana, Illinois, May 6, 7, and 8, 1954. The President explained that the special circumstances of the Centennial Celebration led the Executive Committee to recommend the acceptance of an invitation for two years ahead. It was voted to accept the invitation of Michigan State College to hold the Annual Meeting for 1955 at Michigan State College, East Lansing, on April 28, 29, and 30, 1955.

It was voted that memorials to the following be printed in the *Proceedings*:

#### EDWIN THOMAS MITCHELL

Professor Edwin Thomas Mitchell died April 2, 1953, in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. He was born at Griersville, Ontario, Canada, September 28, 1886, to S. William and Elizabeth Charlotte Mitchell. He was a student at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, 1908-09, and received the B.A. degree from the University of Alberta in 1912, and the M.A. degree in 1913. He married Decima Eveline Robinson, July 1, 1915. They have a daughter, Joyce Margaret Wheelis.

Professor Mitchell received the Ph.D. degree in Philosophy from the University of Chicago in 1923. With the exception of two years, he taught in the department of philosophy at the University of Texas from 1923 till his retirement in June, 1952.

Professor Mitchell was widely known in philosophic circles in the United States and Canada. He was Secretary of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association from 1931 to 1934, and was its President for the year 1936-1937. He was one of the founders of the Southwestern Philosophical Conference and was President in 1941.

Besides publishing some twenty articles in national and international journals, he

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is co-author of *Value, A Cooperative Inquiry*, published 1949, and author of *A System of Ethics*, published 1950. Professor Mitchell was an unusually kind person. He had many friends and was highly respected by all of his colleagues. He was a scholar, a kind person of high integrity, and a genuine friend.

D. L. MILLER

### BOYD HENRY BODE

Boyd Henry Bode died on March 29, 1953, after a lingering illness. He was in his 79th year. Until shortly before the end he taught a large class of graduate students each semester at the University of Florida in Gainesville, where he had settled down after filling important posts as visiting professor in the United States and elsewhere, following his change to professor emeritus. Although a sick man during the last three years of his life, his extraordinary intellect, keen, agile, venturesome, carried on with singular vigor. His lively interest in students and the educational enterprise, and his concern for the welfare of America and of the whole human undertaking did not diminish with the decline of his bodily energies, nor did he lose his warm sparkling sense of humor or his unobtrusive kindness.

Boyd Bode began his professional career as assistant in philosophy at the University of Wisconsin in 1900, coming from Cornell University with a Ph.D. degree, a thorough grounding in the history of philosophy, and a commitment to philosophic idealism. It was as an instructor that he wrote a searching criticism of radical empiricism published in what is now *The Journal of Philosophy*. The concept of selfhood seemed to him the ultimate category in metaphysics, which he declared himself unwilling to abandon for that of pure experience or of objects existing independently of consciousness.

This critique, recognized at once to herald the entrance of a young philosopher on the scene who would have to be reckoned with, was directed primarily at the radical empiricism of William James, and the brunt of it was that this doctrine could not avoid ending in solipsism. It drew a prompt rejoinder from the great pragmatist himself, whose admiration for his "able critic" was outspoken. "If all the criticisms," said William James, "were as sachgemäss as Mr. Bode's, . . . the truth of the matter would more rapidly clear up. Not only is it excellently well written, but it brings its own point of view out clearly, and admits of a perfectly straight reply." He of course made that straight reply, and ended it saying: "I believe that at bottom we are fighting for nothing different, but are both defending the same continuities of experience in different forms of words."

The "continuities of experience" were what Boyd Bode was in search of from his earliest to his latest thinking. But he had to find his own way. Spontaneously appreciative of the insight of others, scrupulously, painstakingly fair in his appraisal of their workmanship, and deeply loyal in his professional as in his intimately personal allegiances, he still had to work things out for himself with toil and sweat, often with mental agony. "Whither the argument leads," said the mellowed Plato, "thither let us follow." This was exactly the Bode practice. It led him from philosophic idealism to pragmatism; then from technical philosophy to the philosophy of education; and, finally, to the exploration of public schooling, from the grades through graduate study, for the most promising means of making democracy more and more fruitful as a way of life.

The early discussion of radical empiricism marked the beginning of an incredible number of articles by him, deep-going and pioneering, contributed to philosophical and psychological journals over a period of twenty-one years, divided between the University of Wisconsin and the University of Illinois. Examined in retrospect, it is evident that the persisting problem was "consciousness." One observes how step by step the facts of human behavior are increasingly drawn upon to substantiate philosophical vision, and how the writer of the papers is pushed steadily toward pragmatism by the force of his own penetrating logic and his strong sense for the actualities.

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During Boyd Bode's dozen years on the Illinois campus the growth of interest in philosophy was phenomenal. Unprecedented undergraduate and graduate class enrollments were only a part of the response to one of the most captivating and at the same time thought-inciting teachers who has ever taught or now teaches anywhere. He was an influential faculty member; his scholarly productivity, as already suggested, continued unabated; he served as president of the Western Philosophical Association. Yet the conviction grew in him that professional philosophizing failed to make contact with the issues most germane to progress in human welfare. Therefore he accepted a call to become professor of education at Ohio State University.

At Ohio State for 23 years he brought to bear his extraordinary mental vitality, his philosophical maturity, and his rich teaching experience. Books now came from his pen—books of his own and in cooperation with other men—along with publications in periodicals. He grew in eminence and in range of influence.

Through it all the goal of the educational process gradually shaped itself into clearness, and he enjoyed the inner peace of understanding. The significant aim of education was to set students going as independent searchers for ways of "continuously extending common interests and purposes among men." To this ideal every subject and every class exercise could make significant contribution. All those who became acquainted with him got some inkling of his greatness of mind and spirit, and they detected something besides. They would have said of him, as he did of his friend, John Dewey: "I have a real affection for that man. He represents sainthood to me in a pragmatic scheme of things."

M. C. OTTO

The following motion by Bertram Morris was adopted:

That the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association express its deeply felt thanks to Washington University for graciously playing host to the Annual Meeting of the Division on the occasion of the Centennial Year of the University; that it thank the Local Committee on arrangements for providing the amenities which have made for a most enjoyable and profitable convention; and that in particular it express its appreciation to Professor Lewis Hahn for taking steps to see that the convention has been consummated in keeping with our cherished ideals of democracy.

The Committee on Academic Freedom (Willis Moore, *Chairman*, William Frankena, and William H. Hay) presented their report and it was voted:

That on the recommendation of its Committee on Academic Freedom the American Philosophical Association (Western Division) hereby officially endorses as a minimum statement the Principles of Academic Freedom and Tenure of the American Association of University Professors (dated 1940) which had been circulated to the membership in advance of this meeting.

The President reported his initiation of inquiries for funds for the support of original work in philosophy and the interest with which his proposals had been received by a certain Foundation. Paul Henle presented the following motion on behalf of the Executive Committee and it was voted that:

1. The division shall have a standing Committee to advance original work in philosophy with the following duties:

- a. To discover sources of funds for philosophical research and writing and to inform the membership of the division concerning them.
- b. To advise individual members of the division upon request as to where they may best seek funds for their original work.
- c. To advise foundations, upon request, as to the value of research plans in philosophy.

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- d. To solicit funds in the name of the division for research and writing which seems important and to allocate and distribute any funds obtained in this way.

2. This committee shall consist of the president and vice-president of the division ex officio and three other members. The first three members shall be appointed by the President, with the approval of the Executive Committee for terms of one, two, and three years, respectively. Thereafter each president shall appoint one member with the approval of the Executive Committee.

3. The research committee shall make an annual report to the membership at the business meeting.

4. This authorization of the committee is to extend only until the business meeting of 1957. At that time the work of the committee shall be reviewed and it shall be decided whether or not to continue it.

The Executive Committee reported that it had received a resolution from the Department of Philosophy at the University of Illinois urging certain procedures in the passing of resolutions. The following statement prepared by the Executive Committee was read:

The following regulations shall represent the policy of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association in taking action or passing resolutions upon issues of academic or social policy.

1. Such actions or resolutions shall be restricted to those issues in which the Division, as a scholarly association of teachers and investigators in philosophy, has some clear important interest and upon which its members, as proficient teachers and investigators in this field, can claim some special competence to speak.

2. Except in cases of emergency, as judged by the Executive Committee of the Division, the members in the general meeting shall take action upon or adopt resolutions concerning important issues of academic or social policy only when the subject at issue has been made known to the members sufficiently in advance of the annual meeting to enable them to form some judgment upon it, and that the Secretary is to remind the members of this policy and to transmit to the membership any proposals received.

3. The interpretation and execution of these regulations shall be a function of the Executive Committee of the Division, subject to confirmation or reversal of its decision by the members in the general meeting, should any member at the meeting wish to call the decision into question.

No action was called for at this time. It was reported that the Executive Committee had ordered that the original resolution together with this statement should be sent to the membership for consideration and that action on this matter be made a special order of business at the next Annual Meeting.

F. P. Harris presented the following resolution and on the recommendation of the Executive Committee it was voted:

That the President of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association appoint for one year, 1953-54, a Committee on Oriental Philosophy to cooperate with the Western Conference on the Teaching of Philosophy, the American Council of Learned Societies, and other relevant professional groups in their proposed project to further teaching and research

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in the field of Oriental Philosophy. Membership of the Committee to be announced in the *Philosopher's Newsletter*. A Committee progress report to be submitted at the next annual meeting.

It was reported that Fritz Marti had been dismissed from Marietta College, Ohio, and that the President of that College had announced that he had decided to eliminate a Department of Philosophy from the College. It was moved by Laurence Laffeur, seconded, and voted:

That the Executive Committee shall make representations to the President and Trustees of Marietta College about the reported elimination of the department of philosophy and shall cooperate with the Ohio Philosophical Association and other organizations in whatever steps can be taken in this matter to continue and improve philosophical teaching at Marietta College.

The President announced that he had appointed Marten ten Hoor as official delegate of the Western Division to the International Congress of Philosophy in Brussels in August.

There being no further business the meeting adjourned at 12:55 p.m.

WILLIAM H. HAY, *Secretary-Treasurer, retiring*

## List of Members

- Abarbanel, Prof. Albert, 319 W. 108th St., New York, N.Y.  
 Abernethy, Prof. George, Davidson College, Davidson, N.C.  
 Ackley, Prof. Sheldon Carmer, 207-08 82nd Ave., New Hyde Park, New York, N.Y.  
 Ackoff, Prof. Russell L., Case Institute of Technology, Cleveland 6, Ohio  
 Adams, Prof. E. M., Apt. 10, Abernethy Hall, Chapel Hill, N.C.  
 Adams, Prof. Eugene Taylor, Colgate University, Hamilton, N.Y.  
 Adams, Prof. George P., University of California, Berkeley, Calif.  
 Adams, Prof. John Stokes, Jr., University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa.  
 Adler, Prof. Mortimer, Institute for Philosophical Research, 2090 Jackson St., San Francisco, Calif.  
 Alderblum, Dr. Nima H., 220 Ocean Ave., Long Branch, N.J.  
 Ahlén, Dr. A. Carl M., 3900 16th Ave. S., Minneapolis 7, Minn.  
 Aiken, Prof. Henry D., Emerson Hall, Harvard University, Cambridge 38, Mass.  
 Akers, Prof. S. L., Wesleyan College, Macon, Ga.  
 Akhilananda, Swami, Ramakrishna Vedanta Society of Massachusetts, 52 Deerfield St., Boston 15, Mass.  
 Albert, Dr. Ethel, 2299 Charing Cross Rd., Baldwin, N.Y.  
 Albert, Dr. Sidney P., 555 Westmoreland Avenue, Syracuse 10, N.Y.  
 Aldrich, Prof. Virgil C., Kenyon College, Gambier, Ohio  
 Alexander, Prof. Hubert G., University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, N.M.  
 Allan, Prof. Denison Maurice, Hampden-Sydney, Va.  
 Allers, Prof. Rudolf, 3310 Dent Pl., N.W., Washington 7, D.C.  
 Alles, Prof. Adam, Long Island University, 385 Flatbush Ave. Extension, Brooklyn 1, N.Y.  
 Almeida, Father Enrique D., Dominican Convent of Quito, Quito, Ecuador  
 Alston, Dr. William, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.  
 Ames, Prof. E. S., 5722 Kimbark Ave., Chicago, Ill.  
 Ames, Prof. Van Meter, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio  
 Anderson, Prof. Frederick, Stanford University, Calif.  
 Anderson, Prof. Fulton H., University of Toronto, Toronto, Ont., Can.  
 Anderson, Prof. John M., Pennsylvania State College, State College, Pa.  
 Anderson, Pres. Paul Russell, Pennsylvania College for Women, Pittsburgh 32, Pa.  
 Andrews, Prof. John T., 5 Storrs Ave., Middlebury, Vt.  
 Angell, Prof. Richard Bradshaw, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Fla.  
 Anshen, Dr. Ruth Nanda, 14 East 81st St., New York, N.Y.  
 Antz, Prof. Louise, New York University, Washington Square, New York 3, N.Y.  
 Apostle, Prof. Hippocrates G., Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa  
 Arbaugh, Dean George Bartholomew, 1114 - 15th Ave., Rock Island, Ill.  
 Arduin, Dr. José y Gómez Mier, 578 Altes Saco St., O'Farrill y Avenida de Acosta, Vibora 76, Havana, Cuba  
 Arndt, Prof. Elmer J., Eden Theological Seminary, Webster Groves, Mo.  
 Aschenbrenner, Prof. Karl, University of California, Berkeley 4, Calif.  
 Ascher, Dr. Anita, Smith College, Northampton, Mass.  
 Ashby, Prof. Warren, The Women's College, Greensboro, N.C.  
 Auld, Mrs. J. W., 726 31st St., Lincoln, Nebraska  
 Austin, Prof. Holcombe McC., Wheaton College, Norton, Mass.  
 Avey, Prof. Albert E., Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio  
 Ayres, Prof. Edith, 72 Barrow St., New York 14, N.Y.  
 Babcock, Prof. Donald C., University of New Hampshire, Durham, N.H.  
 Bachman, Pres. Walter E., York College, York, Nebr.  
 Bahm, Prof. Archie J., University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, N.M.  
 Bajema, Prof. Jacob, University of Dubuque, Dubuque, Iowa  
 Bakan, Dr. Mildred Blynn, 1200 Rollins, Columbia, Mo.  
 Baker, Prof. John Tull, New York University, Washington Square, New York 3, N.Y.  
 Bakewell, Prof. C. M., Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

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- Balduf, Dean E. W., Roosevelt College of Chicago, 430 S. Michigan Ave., Chicago 5, Ill.  
 Baldwin, Prof. Robert C., University of Connecticut, Storrs, Conn.  
 Ballaine, Prof. Francis Knight, Adelphi College, Garden City, N.Y.  
 Ballard, Rev. J. Hudson, 15 Foss Ave., San Anselmo, Calif.  
 Balz, Prof. Albert, University of Virginia, University, Virginia  
 Banner, Prof. William A., 2925 - 10th St., N.E., Washington 17, D.C.  
 Barbour, Prof. Harris M., N. Egmont, Mass.  
 Barnes, Prof. Hazel E., Ohio State University, Columbus 10, Ohio  
 Barnhart, Prof. William R., Hood College, Frederick, Md.  
 Barrett, Prof. Clifford L., Scripps College, Claremont, Calif.  
 Barrett, Prof. Roger W., 1800 Thousand Oaks Blvd., Berkeley 7, Calif.  
 Barrett, Prof. William, New York University, Washington Square, New York 3, N.Y.  
 Bartlett, Prof. George R., Box 2085, University Sta., University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla.  
 Barton, Prof. George E., Jr., 5635 S. Kenwood, Chicago 37, Ill.  
 Barzin, Dr. Marcel, University of Brussels, Belgium  
 Bass, Prof. Robert E., 1619 Campus Drive, Toledo 6, Ohio  
 Baum, Prof. Maurice, Kent State University, Kent, Ohio  
 Baumgardt, Prof. David, 214 Massachusetts Ave., N.E., Washington 2, D.C.  
 Baxter, Dr. Clayton A., Mt. Allison University, Sackville, N.B., Canada  
 Baylis, Prof. Charles A., Duke University, Durham, N.C.  
 Beals, Dr. Lawrence W., Williams College, Williamstown, Mass.  
 Beardsley, Dr. Elizabeth Lane, 221 N. Princeton Ave., Swarthmore, Pa.  
 Beardsley, Prof. Monroe C., Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pa.  
 Beck, Prof. Lewis W., University of Rochester, Rochester, N.Y.  
 Beck, Prof. R. Lloyd, Marshall College, Huntington, W. Va.  
 Beck, Dr. Robert N., 24 Mayflower Rd., Leicester, Mass.  
 Becker, Prof. Frank C., Hollins College, Hollins, Va.  
 Beiswanger, Prof. George W., Georgia State College for Women, Milledgeville, Ga.  
 Belknap, Mr. George N., University of Oregon, Eugene, Ore.  
 Bender, Prof. Thorwald W., 3026 W. Washington Blvd., Chicago 12, Ill.  
 Benjamin, Prof. A. C., University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.  
 Benne, Prof. Kenneth D., 743 N. Wabash Ave., Chicago 11, Ill.  
 Bennion, Prof. Milton, 2385 - 7th East, Salt Lake City, Utah  
 Bentley, Prof. John E., American University, Washington, D.C.  
 Benton, Prof. John Keith, Wesley Hall, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tenn.  
 Berenda, Dr. Carlton W., University of Oklahoma, Norman, Okla.  
 Bergmann, Prof. Gustav, State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa  
 Berle, Dr. Adolf Augustus, 27 West 44th St., New York, N.Y.  
 Berman, Dr. Eleanor Davidson, 26 Ogden Road, Scarsdale, N.Y.  
 Bernard, Prof. Walter, 1010 Beach 28 St., Far Rockaway, N.Y.  
 Berndtson, Prof. Arthur, University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.  
 Bernhardt, Prof. William Henry, 2180 S. Clayton, Denver, Colo.  
 Bernstein, Prof. B. A., University of California, Berkeley, Calif.  
 Berry, Prof. George D. W., Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.  
 Bertocci, Prof. Peter A., 243 Park Ave., Arlington Heights 74, Mass.  
 Bettelheim, Principal Bruno, 1365 East 60th St., Chicago, Ill.  
 Bewkes, Pres. E. G., St. Lawrence University, Canton, N.Y.  
 Bidney, Prof. David, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana  
 Biederman, Mr. Charles I., 547 W. 157th St., New York 32, N.Y.  
 Bigger, Dr. Charles P., III, 172 Parklawn Blvd., Apt. K, Columbus, Ohio  
 Bilsky, Manuel, Faculty Exchange, University of Chicago, Chicago 37, Ill.  
 Binkley, Prof. Luther J., Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, Pa.  
 Bisbee, Prof. Eleanor, 373 Whitman Court, Palo Alto, Calif.  
 Biser, Prof. Erwin, 216 Belmont Ave., Asbury Park, N.J.  
 Bixler, Prof. J. S., Mayflower Hill Drive, Waterville, Me.  
 Black, Prof. Max, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.  
 Blanshard, Prof. Brand, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.  
 Blanshard, Mrs. Frances B., St. Roman St., New Haven, Conn.  
 Blau, Prof. Joseph L., Columbia University, New York 27, N.Y.

## MEMBERS

- Block, Dr. Marguerite, 401 Low Memorial Library, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.  
 Bloté, Dr. Harold C., 228 Scenic Ave., Piedmont, Calif.  
 Blyth, Prof. John W., College Hill, Clinton, N.Y.  
 Boas, Prof. George, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.  
 Bögholt, Prof. Carl, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.  
 Bogoslovsky, Dr. Boris B., Cherry Lawn, Darien, Conn.  
 Bolman, Dr. Frederick deWolfe, Jr., 8 E. 77th St., New York 21, N.Y.  
 Bolton, Prof. Ina A., Texas State University, Houston, Texas  
 Bosley, Dr. Harold, Duke University, Durham, N.C.  
 Boswell, Prof. Foster P., Hobart College, Geneva, N.Y.  
 Boughton, Prof. Jesse, Westminster College, Salt Lake City, Utah  
 Bourke, Prof. Vernon J., St. Louis University, St. Louis, Mo.  
 Bouwsma, Prof. O. K., University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebr.  
 Bowden, Prof. D. J., Elon College, Elon, N.C.  
 Boyer, Prof. Merle Wiliam, Carthage College, Carthage, Ill.  
 Boynton, Prof. Richard W., University of Buffalo, Buffalo, N.Y.  
 Bradshaw, Prof. M. J., Bangor Theological Seminary, Bangor, Me.  
 Brady, Prof. Mary L., 525 W. 238 St., New York 63, N.Y.  
 Brameld, Prof. Theodore B., New York University, Washington Square, New York, N.Y.  
 Brandt, Prof. Richard B., Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pa.  
 Brautigam, Prof. Herman A., Colgate University, Hamilton, N.Y.  
 Brennan, Prof. Joseph G., Barnard College, Columbia University, New York 27, N.Y.  
 Briggs, Dr. William, 32 Sydney St., St. Johns, N.B., Canada  
 Brinton, Prof. Howard, Pendle Hill, Wallingford, Pa.  
 Brockway, Dr. Fred A., 18 E. Hamilton St., Baltimore 2, Md.  
 Brodbeck, Prof. May, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.  
 Brogan, Dean A. P., University of Texas, Austin, Texas  
 Bronstein, Prof. D. J., College of the City of New York, New York, N.Y.  
 Broudy, Dr. Harry S., State Teachers College, Framingham, Mass.  
 Brown, Prof. A. E., Lambuth College, Jackson, Tenn.  
 Brown, Principal James G., Union College, Vancouver, B.C., Canada  
 Brown, Prof. Stuart, Jr., Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.  
 Browne, Prof. Samuel S. S., University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio  
 Browning, Prof. Robert W., The College of Liberal Arts, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.  
 Brumbaugh, Prof. Robert S., Yale University, New Haven, Conn.  
 Brush, Prof. Francis W., University of Denver, Denver, Colo.  
 Bryan, Pres. W. L., Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind.  
 Buchanan, Mr. Emerson, Room 228M Butler Library, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.  
 Buchanan, Prof. Scott M., Richmond, Mass.  
 Buchler, Prof. Justus, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.  
 Buck, Roger Conant, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.  
 Buckley, Prof. Joseph W., 37 Avalon Ave., Bedford, Ohio  
 Bugbee, Prof. Henry G., Emerson Hall, Cambridge 38, Mass.  
 Burch, Prof. George B., Tufts College, Medford 55, Mass.  
 Bures, Prof. Charles E., California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, Calif.  
 Burkhardt, Pres. Frederick H., Bennington College, Bennington, Vt.  
 Burks, Dr. Arthur W., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.  
 Burnett, Prof. Richard, Lawrence College, Appleton, Wis.  
 Burnham, Prof. James, New York University, Washington Square, New York, N.Y.  
 Burtt, Prof. E. A., Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.  
 Buschman, Prof. Harold, University of Kansas City, Kansas City 4, Mo.  
 Bushman, Sister Rita Marie, Fontbonne College, St. Louis 5, Mo.  
 Bussey, Prof. Gertrude C., Goucher College, Baltimore, Md.  
 Buswell, Pres. James Oliver, Jr., Shelton College, 340 W. 55th St., New York 19, N.Y.  
 Butt, Dr. S. McClellan, 3626 Van Ness St., N.W., Washington 8, D.C.  
 Butterfield, Pres. Victor, Wesleyan University, Middletown, Conn.  
 Cailliet, Prof. Emile, 31 Alexander St., Princeton, N.J.

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- Cairns, Prof. Dorion, 2230 University Ave., New York 68, N.Y.  
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